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SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION WITHOUT CLASS 
ACTIONS 
David H. Webber* 
In this Article, I imagine a post-class-action landscape for shareholder litigation. 
Projecting an environment in which both securities-fraud and transactional class 
actions are hobbled by procedural or substantive reforms—most likely through the 
adoption of mandatory-arbitration provisions or fee-shifting provisions—I assess 
what shareholder litigation would disappear, what (if any) would remain, and 
what a post-class-action landscape would look like. I argue that loss of the class 
action would remove a layer of legal insulation that prevents institutional 
investors from having to pursue positive-value claims against companies. 
Currently, the class action effectively ratifies fund fiduciary passivity in the face of 
fraud, for example, as long as the institution files a claim form to collect its share 
of a class action settlement that has been judicially certified. But without the class 
action, monitoring and litigation costs for such institutions may increase because 
fund fiduciaries must monitor their portfolios for, and litigate, positive-value 
claims. Failure to do so could expose them to liability to fund beneficiaries. I offer 
some suggestive, but incomplete, evidence about how many funds will have 
positive-value claims. Whether institutions in fact pursue such claims will 
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decisively determine whether shareholder litigation has a post-class-action future. 
I also argue that bizarre gaps in liability coverage for public-pension-fund 
fiduciaries—who serve the funds that have traditionally been the most active 
litigants—may have unpredictable effects on trustee behavior outside the class 
action, may tilt in favor of bringing claims, and may also lead to herding behavior 
in arbitration. I also assess how loss of the class action would affect plaintiff law 
firms. I argue that the end of the class action means, at a minimum, abandonment 
of the idea that investors should be compensated for losses due to fraud or other 
corporate malfeasance. And I demonstrate that loss of the class action leaves 
investors in smaller firms with no legal remedy for wrongdoing, even if some form 
of litigation survives. 
Finally, I argue that shareholder litigation without class actions—should 
institutional investors choose to pursue it—would create a new distortion in the 
private enforcement regime, what I call the “semi-circularity problem.” Without 
class actions, negative-value claimants would no longer be able to recover for 
their damages in shareholder litigation. But they would still be forced to subsidize 
the losses of positive-value claimants to the extent that the smaller investors own 
shares in defendant companies that must pay damages claims to large institutional 
investor plaintiffs. Loss of the class action device creates a two-tier legal system 
for investors: one in which large institutions may recover while individuals and 
smaller institutions do not from the same fraud (or mispriced deal), and one in 
which smaller investors that still own defendant companies must reach farther into 
their pockets to compensate large institutional investor losses for that fraud (or 
mispriced deal). 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the past 20 years, the securities class action has endured a series of 
existential crises. The most recent example was Erica P. John Fund v. Halliburton 
(Halliburton II),1 in which the Supreme Court considered overruling precedent that 
had allowed plaintiffs to rely on the fraud-on-the-market theory to demonstrate 
reliance in fraud cases.2 Without this theory, the shareholder class action cannot 
proceed because individualized issues of reliance would predominate over 
common issues and therefore the shareholder class could not be certified under 
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.3 As on prior occasions, the 
securities class action survived the existential challenge in Halliburton II. And, as 
on prior occasions, it did not do so intact. The Court’s decision allows defendants 
to challenge whether the alleged misrepresentation affected the stock price at the 
class certification stage, rather than at the summary judgment stage.4 Allowing 
defendants to challenge causation at an earlier stage in the proceeding tilted 
securities litigation even further in their favor.5 In so doing, Halliburton II 
continued the general trend that recently led Professor Barbara Black to quip that, 
                                                                                                                
 1. 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014). 
 2. Id. at 2407. 
 3. Stephen M. Sinaiko and Arielle Warshall Katz, The Future Of The “Fraud 
On The Market” Presumption In Securities Litigation: A Not-So-Basic Question, THE 
METROPOLITAN CORPORATE COUNSEL, Dec. 18, 2013, at 26. 
 4. Jordan Eth and Mark R.S. Foster, Beyond Basic: Supreme Court’s 
Halliburton Ruling Strengthens Defenses In Securities Fraud Class Actions, MONDAQ (July 
7, 2014), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/324908/Securities/Beyond+Basic+Supr
eme+Courts+Halliburton+Ruling+Strengthens+Defenses+in+Securities+Fraud+Class+Acti
ons (“Now defendants ‘may seek to defeat the Basic presumption’ at class certification, 
rather than waiting for summary judgment or trial, by seeking to introduce ‘direct as well as 
indirect price impact evidence.’ To do so, defendants can submit expert analyses, including 
event studies, that demonstrate specific alleged misrepresentations did not affect the market 
price of a stock. The Court reasoned that permitting this rebuttal by defendants at class 
certification was necessary ‘to maintain the consistency of the presumption with the class 
certification requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.’”). 
 5. Id. (“By explicitly allowing defendants to rebut the presumption of 
reliance . . . the Halliburton decision alters the status quo of securities litigation, and is 
likely to breathe new life into the class certification stage of securities class actions.”). 
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“[t]he attacks on the securities fraud class action never end.”6 Beginning with the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”), a series of statutory 
and judicial reforms to the securities class action have: (1) placed a ceiling on 
damages;7 (2) eliminated aiding and abetting liability;8 (3) eliminated liability for 
fraud participants who were nonspeakers;9 (4) denied discovery prior to a ruling on 
the motion to dismiss;10 (5) instituted a higher pleading standard for scienter (the 
highest pleading standard in civil procedure);11 (6) narrowed the scope of 
causation;12 (7) barred the litigation of securities cases by classes of 50 or more 
people in state court;13 and (8) allowed defendants to contest the efficiency of the 
market for purposes of the fraud-on-the-market theory.14 
The elimination of the securities class action has long been the goal of 
some academics, policymakers, and business lobbies.15 It is also part of a long- 
term retrenchment in the private attorney-general model for enforcing federal 
statutes generally.16 At several points in this “death-of-a-thousand-cuts” approach 
                                                                                                                
 6. Barbara Black, Eliminating Securities Class Actions Under the Radar, 2009 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 802, 802 (2009). 
 7. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e) (2012). 
 8. Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 
(1994). 
 9. Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148 (2008) (finding 
respondents not liable to petitioner because respondents’ deceptive acts were not relied 
upon by petitioners); Janus Capital Grp. Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 
(2011) (limiting primary liability under Rule 10b-5 to those persons who “made” the alleged 
misstatement). 
 10. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2012). 
 11. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007). See also 
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 566 U.S. 662, 678 
(2009) (raising pleading standards from a “possibility” to a “plausibility” standard asking 
“for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” (citing Twombly, 
550 U.S. at 556)). 
 12. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005). 
 13. See 15 U.S.C. § 77p(c) (2012) (stating that “any covered class action in any 
State court involving a covered security . . . . shall be removable to the Federal district court 
for the district in which the action is pending”). 
 14. See In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2006). 
Additionally, as I noted above, due to the Supreme Court ruling in Halliburton II, 
defendants can now present evidence to defeat the Basic presumption of reliance at an 
earlier stage of litigation, specifically, the class certification stage. See supra note 4 and 
accompanying text.  
 15. Hal S. Scott & Leslie N. Silverman, Stockholder Adoption of Mandatory 
Individual Arbitration for Stockholder Disputes, 36 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1187, 1205 
(2013) (discussing the numerous scholars and committees who believe that “securities class 
actions are a major contributor to making the U.S. capital markets less competitive and less 
attractive”). 
 16. Stephen Burbank & Sean Farhang, Litigation Reform: An Institutional 
Approach, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1543 (2014). Some scholars argue that the rise of shareholder 
activism as a mechanism for policing managerial agency costs may be a response to the 
policing void left by the narrowing of the shareholder class action. See James D. Cox and 
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to securities class action reform, the threat of the latest reform was viewed as 
existential. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.17 threatened to raise the 
pleading burden for a “strong inference” of scienter—adopted in the PSLRA—to 
the point where surviving a motion to dismiss would be impossible in all but the 
most egregious frauds where the relevant factual information most likely became 
public through either a whistleblower or a governmental investigation.18 In the 
legislative arena, academic critics and powerful interest groups—including the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Business Roundtable—have repeatedly called 
for elimination or reform of such actions.19 Such legislation may be more likely to 
pass under Republican majorities in the House and Senate, although even divided 
governments have adopted similar legislation—the PSLRA was adopted by a 
Republican House and a Democratic Senate after the Senate overrode the veto of 
President Clinton, a fellow Democrat.20 Immediately preceding the recent financial 
crisis, the Paulson Committee, appointed by former Secretary of the Treasury 
Henry Paulson, argued that shareholder litigation undermined the competitiveness 
of U.S. capital markets and called for increased guidance from the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) regarding the pleading for a 10b-5 claim and the 
pursuit of alternatives to litigation for shareholders.21 These proposals dropped off 
of the legislative agenda during and after the recent financial crisis. But if history 
is any guide, it is only a matter of time before additional legislative threats to the 
existence of the 10b-5 class action emerge. The only thing that might prevent this 
                                                                                                                
Randall S. Thomas, Addressing Agency Costs through Private Litigation in the U.S.: 
Tensions, Disappointments, and Substitutes, (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 17. 551 U.S. 308 (2007). In his Tellabs concurrence, Justice Scalia argued that 
“strong inference” should mean that the facts as pleaded had to be “more plausible than the 
inference of innocence,” a far cry from the then-prevalent notice pleading standard. (I note 
that Scalia’s standard is not the one adopted by the Court). Even now, the Tellabs standard 
is a substantially higher burden than today’s general pleading standards under Twombly and 
Iqbal, which require that the plaintiff’s claim be plausible, but not more plausible than the 
defendant’s competing inference of innocence. Stephen Burbank has pointed out that certain 
language in Twombly can be read to be even more demanding than the PSLRA standard 
interpreted in Tellabs, a reading that Burbank concludes “would be ridiculous.” Stephen B. 
Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of “General Rules,” 2009 WISC. L. REV. 535, 552. 
(2009). The standard also requires pleading facts. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 329. 
 18. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 324 (resolving a circuit split by holding that “[t]he 
inference that the defendant acted with scienter need not be irrefutable, i.e., of the 
‘smoking-gun’ genre, or even the ‘most plausible of competing inferences’” (quoting Fidel 
v. Farley, 392 F.3d 220, 227 (6th Cir. 2004))). 
 19. See, e.g., U.S. Chamber Policy Priorities for 2014, U.S. CHAMBER OF 
COMMERCE, 30 (2014) https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/2014_policy
_priorities-september_2014.pdf (listing that they seek to “[o]ppose efforts by plaintiffs’ bar 
to expand the abuse of the class action device” among other policy initiatives). 
 20. Nicole M. Briski, comment, Pleading Scienter Under the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Did Congress Eliminate Recklessness, Motive and 
Opportunity?, 32 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 155, 169 (2000) (“Despite President Clinton’s concerns 
that Congress raised the pleading standard for scienter above that of the Second Circuit, 
Congress overrode President Clinton’s veto and enacted the PSLRA into law . . . .”). 
 21. R. Glenn Hubbard & John L. Thornton, Action Plan for Capital Markets¸ 
WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 2006, at A16. 
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reemergence, even under Republican congressional control, is that legislative 
reform would be mooted by procedural and judicial changes that threaten to 
eliminate these actions without a vote. That would fit a long standing pattern of 
legislatures avoiding action on litigation reform, possibly because they see that 
reform is taking place in the courts, though perhaps also because of the difficulty 
of legislating class action reforms.22 
The most serious threats to the shareholder class action have already 
emerged in two forms: unilateral board adoption of mandatory-arbitration 
provisions or fee-shifting provisions in corporate bylaws. These threats follow the 
aforementioned pattern in which class action opponents have shifted their efforts 
to procedural, rather than substantive, reforms.23 
Beginning with arbitration provisions, the Supreme Court’s recent 
Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) decisions combined with corporate-law decisions 
in Delaware and elsewhere, strongly suggest that there is no remaining legal 
barrier to a board unilaterally adopting bylaws requiring mandatory bilateral 
arbitration of shareholder claims against the company, its board, or its managers. 
Professor Brian Fitzpatrick has argued, that in the aftermath of Supreme Court 
cases like AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion24 and American Express Co. v. 
Italian Colors Restaurant,25 businesses can bind their shareholders to arbitration 
clauses with class action waivers, as long as the terms of the waiver are themselves 
legal.26 In Concepcion, the Supreme Court upheld a mandatory-arbitration 
provision in an AT&T cell phone contract, concluding that the FAA preempted 
California’s criteria for determining when waivers in consumer contracts could be 
deemed unconscionable.27 In American Express, the Supreme Court held that the 
FAA “does not permit courts to invalidate a contractual waiver of class arbitration 
on the ground that the plaintiff’s cost of individually arbitrating a federal statutory 
claim exceeds the potential recovery.”28 Fitzpatrick discusses these cases in the 
context of shareholder approval of such bylaws,29 but it appears as if shareholder 
approval may not be necessary under the recent Delaware holdings, Boilermakers 
Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp.30 and ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher 
                                                                                                                
 22. Burbank & Farhang, supra note 16. 
 23. Id. (describing the tactical shift by critics of the private attorney-general 
model to pursue procedural rather than substantive or legislative reforms).  
 24. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 25. 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2306 (2013). 
 26. Brian Fitzpatrick, Is the End of Class Actions Upon Us?, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 14, 2011, 9:55 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/09/is-the-end-
of-class-actions-upon-us/ [hereinafter Fitzpatrick, SCOTUSblog]. 
 27. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1740. 
 28. Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 2306. 
 29. Fitzpatrick, SCOTUSblog, supra note 26 (discussing the “transactional 
relationship” between those who bring class actions and the businesses they bring class 
actions against); see also Brian Fitzpatrick, The End of Class Actions?, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 161 
(forthcoming 2015) [hereinafter Fitzpatrick, The End]. 
 30. 73 A.3d 934, 939 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
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Tennis Bund.31 Ms. Claudia Allen has argued that Concepcion, American Express, 
and these recent Delaware decisions suggest that a board-adopted mandatory 
bylaw with a class action waiver would be enforceable, even if it sidestepped 
shareholder approval.32 All of this cements the argument that there is no remaining 
legal barrier to unilateral board adoption of mandatory-arbitration or fee-shifting 
provisions. In Boilermakers, then-Chancellor (and current Chief Justice of the 
Delaware Supreme Court) Leo Strine upheld a forum-selection clause mandating 
that shareholders sue the company only in Delaware33 even though the board 
adopted the clause without shareholder approval.34 The court held that Delaware 
law places shareholders on notice that boards may change corporate bylaws at any 
time without shareholder approval, so long as the bylaw complies with § 109 of 
the Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”), which bars bylaws that 
conflict with the law.35 Mandatory-arbitration and fee-shifting bylaws might once 
have conflicted with the law, but this no longer seems to be the case after 
Concepcion and American Express.36 
Corporate boards’ power to chip away at shareholder class actions was 
further solidified in the second Delaware opinion, ATP. There, the Delaware 
Supreme Court enforced a board-adopted bylaw that instituted a “plaintiff-pays”37 
provision that requires shareholders to pay the company’s attorneys’ fees if the 
shareholders “[do] not obtain a judgment on the merits that substantially achieves, 
in substance and amount, the full remedy sought.”38 Although the Delaware 
legislature is considering amending the DGCL to bar such “loser pays” provisions, 
the precedent stands.39 Boards may unilaterally limit the rights of company 
                                                                                                                
 31. 91 A.3d 554, 558 (Del. 2014). 
 32. Claudia Allen, Bylaws Mandating Arbitration of Stockholder Disputes?, 39 
DEL. J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2444771. 
 33. Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 939 (holding that “the bylaws are valid and 
enforceable contractual forum selection clauses”). 
 34. Id. See also North v. McNamara, No. 1:13-cv-833, 2014 WL 4684377, at *1, 
*7 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 19, 2014) (upholding a board-adopted forum-selection clause and 
stating that such forum selection clauses generate “cost and efficiency benefits that inure to 
the corporation and its shareholders by streamlining litigation.”). 
 35. Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 939–40 (“[W]hen investors bought stock in 
Chevron and FedEx, they knew (i) that consistent with 8 Del. C. § 109(a), the certificates of 
incorporation gave the boards the power to adopt and amend bylaws unilaterally . . . and 
(iii) that board-adopted bylaws are binding on the stockholders.”). 
 36. See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text. 
 37. Such provisions are frequently referred to as “loser-pays” provisions, but I 
call them “plaintiff-pays” provisions because plaintiff could still win a judgment on the 
merits and be forced to pay the defendants’ legal bill under the provision approved in ATP. 
 38. ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 557 (Del. 2014). 
 39. See The Fate of Delaware “Fee-Shifting” Bylaws, WSGR (July 11, 2014), 
http://www.wsgr.com/WSGR/Display.aspx?SectionName=publications/PDFSearch/wsgrale
rt-fee-shifting-0714.htm; SB 236, An Act to Amend Title 8 of the Delaware Code Relating to 
General Corporate Law, OPEN:STATES (last visited Oct. 14, 2014) 
http://openstates.org/de/bills/147/SB236/ 
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shareholders to sue them, within the broad limits of § 109.40 Boilermakers and 
ATP strongly suggest that a board can unilaterally adopt a bylaw requiring 
shareholders to arbitrate their claims, in part because the bylaw does not bar these 
claims, but rather changes the forum in which they may be brought. That such a 
provision would economically bar a remedy for meritorious but negative-value 
claims41 would not seem to pose a legal barrier to their adoption. It did not stop the 
U.S. Supreme Court from enforcing the mandatory-arbitration provision in 
American Express.42 In fact, under the U.S. Supreme Court’s arbitration 
jurisprudence, the Delaware legislature might be preempted under the FAA from 
barring board adoption of such mandatory-arbitration provisions.43 
Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court has narrowed the prospects for class 
arbitration. In Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animal Feeds International Corp.,44 the Court 
held that arbitration provisions could not be construed to require class arbitration 
absent consent to the class mechanism. Yet it left for another day the question of 
what contractual basis might support a finding that the parties agreed to authorize 
class action arbitration.45 In Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter,46 the Supreme 
Court unanimously rejected the petitioners’ contention that an arbitrator exceeded 
his powers under § 10(a)(4) of the FAA after the arbitrator found that the parties 
had impliedly consented to class arbitration.47 These holdings requiring at least 
implicit consent to class arbitration contrast with the approach taken in 
international investor arbitration cases like Abaclat & Others (formerly Giovanna 
                                                                                                                
 40. ATP, 91 A.3d at 558 (“Neither the DGCL nor any other Delaware statute 
forbids the enactment of fee-shifting bylaws.”). 
 41. “Negative Value class actions . . . are class actions where the costs in 
establishing and collecting the individual claims are greater than the potential recovery.” 
Martin H. Redish & Clifford W. Berlow, The Class Action as Political Theory, 85 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 753, 762 (2007). 
 42. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311 (2013) (“But 
the fact that it is not worth the expense involved in proving a statutory remedy does not 
constitute the elimination of the right to pursue that remedy.”). 
 43. Allen, supra note 32 (manuscript at 4–5) (“Reflecting the policy favoring 
arbitration, the Supreme Court has held that state rules or laws that have a disproportionate 
impact on, or discriminate against, arbitration agreements are preempted by the FAA . . . .”). 
See also, Fitzpatrick, The End, supra note 29, at 187 (“[I]f Delaware decided as a matter of 
its corporate law that corporations could not place arbitration clauses or class action waivers 
in corporate bylaws or charters, there is at least an argument that the FAA could not 
preempt that decision: corporate law is traditionally the domain of the states and there are 
doctrines that force courts to presume that Congress did not intend to preempt state laws in 
traditional state domains. On the other hand, contract law, too, is traditionally the domain of 
the states, but that did not give the Supreme Court pause in Concepcion. In the end, then I 
remain pessimistic that state law can slow class action waivers.”) 
 44. 559 U.S. 662 (2010). 
 45. Id. at 685 (finding that a contractual basis is necessary to compel a party to 
submit to class arbitration because “class-action arbitration changes the nature of arbitration 
to such a degree that it cannot be presumed the parties consented to it by simply agreeing to 
submit their disputes to an arbitrator”). 
 46. 133 S. Ct. 2064 (2013). 
 47. Id. 
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a Beccara & Others) v. Argentine Republic,48 in which an international arbitration 
panel took jurisdiction over the collectively filed claims of 60,000 Italian 
bondholders dissatisfied with the restructuring of Argentine debt.49 The arbitration 
clause in Abaclat excluded consent to class arbitration, but the arbitrators reasoned 
that they had jurisdiction over each individual claimant and that “no separate 
consent was required with regard to the form of the proceeding.”50 Taken together, 
these U.S. cases suggest that corporate boards could unilaterally adopt carefully 
drafted bylaws that require shareholders to arbitrate against them in bilateral 
proceedings and that bar class arbitration or consolidation of such proceedings. 
Such provisions, if upheld, would effectively terminate the possibility of collective 
prosecution of fraud and transactional claims. 
These U.S. court decisions all but reverse the SEC’s current policy 
barring mandatory-arbitration provisions, at least at the initial public offering 
(“IPO”) stage.51 Historically, the SEC refused to accelerate the registration 
statements for companies going public whose charters included mandatory-
arbitration provisions.52 Most recently, when the Carlyle Group sought to go 
public, they “include[d] a provision that would have required future stockholders 
to resolve any claim against [them] through arbitration rather than in court” in their 
initial filings.53 Additionally, the provision precluded class action arbitration.54 
Carlyle withdrew the provision from its filing documents after encountering 
opposition from the SEC, potential investors, and shareholder rights activists.55  
In light of the Supreme Court’s pro-arbitration jurisprudence, it would not 
be surprising if companies in the process of going public were to push back harder 
against the SEC’s position on mandatory arbitration, particularly if there is a 
                                                                                                                
 48. Giovanna a Beccara, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction 
and Admissibility, (Aug. 4, 2011), sub nom. Abacalat & others v. Argentine Republic. 
 49. See W.W. Park, The Politics of Class Action Arbitration: Jurisdictional 
Legitimacy and Vindication of Contract Rights, in ARBITRATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
BUSINESS DISPUTES (2d ed. 2012) (discussing Abaclat). 
 50. Id. (contrasting the approaches to class arbitration taken in Animal Feeds and 
Abaclat, and noting Animal Feeds’s effect on the economics of arbitration: “For the [Animal 
Feeds] majority, respondents’ failure to consent to class proceedings trumped any efficiency 
benefits from collective arbitration such as the sharing of costs that might otherwise inhibit 
pursuit of claims.”). 
 51. Karan Singh Tyagi & Gide Loyrette Nouel, Carlyle Leaves out Mandatory 
Arbitration Clause in IPO, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG (Feb. 7, 2012), 
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2012/02/07/carlyle-leaves-out-mandatory-arbitration-
clause-in-ipo/ (“Historically the SEC has disfavored mandatory shareholder arbitration 
provisions.”). 
 52. Id. (“In 1990, when Franklin First Financial Corp that was planning its IPO 
sought to include an arbitration provision in its charter and bylaws, the SEC firmly objected 
to its inclusion.”). 
 53. Miles Weiss et al., Carlyle Drops Class-Action Lawsuit Ban as Opposition 
Mounts, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 3, 2012, 5:57 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-
03/carlyle-drops-class-action-lawsuit-ban.html. 
 54. Tyagi & Nouel, supra note 51. 
 55. Id. 
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change in administration.56 Regardless of whether the SEC maintains its position 
against such provisions, there are already examples of boards unilaterally adopting 
them. Most recently, in Corvex Management, LP v. Commonwealth REIT,57 the 
Circuit Court of Maryland upheld a mandatory-arbitration bylaw that had been 
unilaterally adopted by the board58—and Commonwealth REIT is not alone.59 The 
effect of such bylaws, should they become widely adopted, would likely be “a 
marked decline in class actions.”60 The primary purpose of arbitration provisions 
in this context is not to shift shareholder claims from judges to arbitrators, but to 
eliminate the claims entirely by undermining their economic viability. In his 
dissenting opinion in Concepcion, Justice Breyer noted that, for negative-value 
claimants, the loss of the class action is a substantive waiver of their claims.61 
There was a time when this purpose would have been illegitimate, and would have 
led to courts striking down such provisions.62 But American Express made clear 
that that time has passed. 
It is true that some arguments remain as to why arbitration provisions 
might not be enforceable in the shareholder context. One such argument is that the 
securities laws explicitly bar anything that would reduce or eliminate the 
shareholder rights they provide.63 The SEC has relied on such provisions to resist 
the adoption of mandatory-arbitration clauses.64 However, Concepcion and 
                                                                                                                
 56. See Weiss et al., supra note 53 (“Former SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt said the 
issue probably faced 3-2 ideological split on the current commission . . . .”). But see id. 
(suggesting that Carlyle faced pushback from the SEC, potential investors, and other 
interested parties). 
 57. 2013 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 3 (Cir. Ct. Balt. May 8, 2013). In the interest of 
full disclosure, the Author submitted an affidavit, along with other academics, opposing 
Commonwealth REIT’s adoption of a mandatory-arbitration provision. We were not 
persuasive. 
 58. Corvex Mgmt. v. Commonwealth REIT, 2013 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 3 (Cir. Ct. 
Balt. May 8, 2013). 
 59. See, e.g., id.; Holly Gregory, The Elusive Promise of Reducing Shareholder 
Litigation Through Corporate Bylaws, HARVARD LAW SCH. FORUM ON CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REGULATION (June 9, 2014, 9:25 AM), http://blogs.
law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2014/06/09/; Fitzpatrick, SCOTUSblog, supra note 26. 
 60. Allen, supra note 32 (manuscript at 3). 
 61. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1761 (2011) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting) (“In California’s perfectly rational view, nonclass arbitration over such 
[small] sums will also sometimes have the effect of depriving claimants of their 
claims . . . .”); see also Am, Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
 62. See e.g., Mistubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,473 U.S. 
614 (1985). 
 63. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (2012) (“Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding 
any person to waive compliance with any provision of this chapter or of any rule or 
regulation thereunder, or of any rule of a self-regulatory organization, shall be void.”). 
 64. See Ralph C. Ferrara & Stacy A. Puente, Holding IPOs Hostage to Class 
Actions: Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in IPOs, 9 SEC. LITIG. REP. 1, 4 (2012) (“The 
mandatory arbitration clause is by no means a novel invention. The [SEC]’s established 
position has been that such clauses were void—particularly where the clause would limit a 
shareholder’s ability to enforce his or her rights under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 
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American Express offer little comfort that the Court would defer to the SEC’s view 
of the securities laws, or that the securities laws would trump the FAA or 
Delaware corporate law.65 Despite the limited, if nonexistent, legal barriers to the 
widespread adoption of mandatory-arbitration and class action waivers, it remains 
possible that businesses will not adopt them for a variety of reasons—including 
opposition by their own shareholders. Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”), 
the powerful proxy advisory firm, has stated that it recommends voting against 
directors who vote to unilaterally amend company bylaws without shareholder 
approval, and recently clarified that this advice includes unilateral amendments 
affecting litigation rights.66 This could provide a powerful nonlegal counterweight 
to arbitration provisions (and the plaintiff pays provisions discussed below) 
because of ISS’s strong influence over proxy voters.67 Similarly, the Council of 
Institutional Investors (“CII”), a powerful investor coalition, has publicly stated its 
opposition to the adoption of such provisions.68 It and its members may be able to 
dissuade corporate boards from adopting such bylaws. It is noteworthy that CII has 
taken this position, given that its constituents comprise the set of investors that is 
most likely to have positive-value claims and therefore most likely to be able to 
continue to pursue those claims in arbitration.69 I will return to this point below. 
Even investors beyond CII may be interested in obtaining credible commitments 
from their investees that they should have a remedy for fraud, and may demand 
retraction of mandatory-arbitration or “plaintiff-pays” provisions, or contract 
around such provisions, before investing.  
                                                                                                                
which would violate the prohibition against waiver of rights under Section 29(a) of the 
Exchange Act.” (internal citations omitted)); Christos Ravanides, Arbitration Clauses in 
Public Company Charters: An Expansion of the ADR Elysian Fields or A Descent into 
Hades?, 18 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 371, 407 (2008) (“The SEC . . . has been shortsightedly 
insisting on a near ban on experimentation with ADR methods for domestic 
companies . . . .”). 
 65. See supra text accompanying notes 24–36. 
 66. Ferrara & Puente, supra note 64. 
 67. Michael J. Ryan, Jr., U.S. Capital Markets Competitiveness: The Unfinished 
Agenda, CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 5 (2011), 
https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/legacy/reports/1107_UnfinishedAgenda_WE
B.pdf; see also James Cotter, Alan Palmiter & Randall Thomas, ISS Recommendations and 
Mutual Fund Voting on Proxy Proposals, 55 VILL. L. REV. 1, 31 (2010) (finding that “with 
a proposal that management recommends to shareholders, a negative ISS recommendation 
seems to reduce the number of all shareholder ‘for’ votes by 28.8%” and that “when 
management is opposed to a proposal, a negative ISS recommendation appears to lead to 
another 33.3% drop in all shareholder voting support”). 
 68. See, e.g., Letter from Jeff Mahoney, Gen. Counsel, Council of Institutional 
Investors, to Keith F. Higgins & John Ramsey, Dirs., U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n (Dec. 
11, 2013) (available at: http://www.cii.org/files/issues_and_advocacy/correspondence
/2013/12_11_13_CII_letter_to_SEC_forced_arbitration.pdf). See also Letter from Jeff 
Mahoney, Gen. Counsel, Council of Institutional Investors, to Patrick J. Leahy & Charles 
Grassley, U.S. Senate (Dec. 12, 2013) (available at: http://www.cii.org/files/issues_and_
advocacy/correspondence/2013/12_12_13_CII_letter_to_senate_judiciary_forced_arbitratio
n.pdf). 
 69. See discussion infra Part V. 
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Many of these same arguments apply to fee-shifting provisions.70 In the 
aforementioned ATP case, the Delaware Supreme Court approved unilateral board 
adoption of a fee-shifting bylaw that stated, in pertinent part: 
In the event that . . . the Claiming Party . . . does not obtain a 
judgment on the merits that substantially achieves, in substance and 
amount, the full remedy sought, then each Claiming Party shall be 
obligated jointly and severally to reimburse the League and any 
such member or Owners for all fees, costs and expenses of every 
kind and description (including, but not limited to, all reasonable 
attorneys’ fees and other litigation expenses) (collectively, 
“Litigation Costs”) that the parties may incur in connection with 
such Claim.71 
As noted, the Delaware legislature is actively considering overturning the 
Delaware Supreme Court’s ruling in ATP, and there are mounting efforts to 
challenge it or limit its scope.72 But already, 42 companies have adopted such 
“loser-pays,” or what I call “plaintiff-pays” provisions, and some top law firms 
have started incorporating them into certificates of incorporation in preparation for 
IPOs.73 Under their own terms, even a favorable judgment on the merits that 
obtains something less than “substantially . . . the full remedy sought” would still 
require the plaintiff to pay legal fees;74 so would a favorable settlement that falls 
short of a judgment on the merits. Provisions like these would expose plaintiffs to 
substantial litigation costs, complicating the positive-value claim calculation. 
Plaintiffs’ lawyers may be willing to bear the risk of a lost lawsuit from which they 
recoup no legal fee and incur uncompensated out-of-pocket litigation costs, but 
they may not be willing to bear the high risk of the defendants’ legal costs too. 
They might rationally abandon securities class actions for another field. True, there 
may be more legal barriers to the institution of fee-shifting provisions than there 
are for mandatory-arbitration provisions, even apart from a decision by the 
                                                                                                                
 70. John C. Coffee, Jr., Fee-Shifting and the SEC: Does It Still Believe in Private 
Enforcement?, CLS BLUESKY BLOG (Oct. 14, 2014), http://clsbluesky.law.
columbia.edu/2014/10/14/fee-shifting-and-the-sec-does-it-still-believe-in-private-
enforcement/. 
 71. ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 556 (Del. 2014). 
 72. S.J. Resolution 12 147th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2014) ("[T]he Governor and the 
Delaware General Assembly strongly support a level playing field that provides the ability 
for stockholders and investors to seek relief on its merits in the Courts of this State and 
believe that a proliferation of broad fee-shifting bylaws for stock corporations will upset the 
careful balance that the State has strived to maintain between the interests of directors, 
officers, and controlling stockholders, and the interests of other stockholders.") The 
Delaware General Assembly will revisit this issue in early 2015. 
 73. John C. Coffee, “Loser Pays: Who Will Be The Biggest Loser?” http://clsblu
esky.law.columbia.edu/2014/11/24/loser-pays-who-will-be-the-biggest-loser/; see also Lee 
Rudy, Litigation Bylaws, CII (Nov. 19, 2014), http://www.cii.org/files/issues_and_a
dvocacy/legal_issues/Litigation%20Bylaws.pdf?utm_source=12-04-14+CII+Gover
nance+Alert&utm_campaign=12-04-14+CII+Alert&utm_medium=email (documenting 42 
companies that adopted fee-shifting bylaws as of Nov. 19, 2014). 
 74. ATP Tour, 91 A.3d at 557. 
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Delaware legislature to backtrack on them. For example, a federal court could 
discover a conflict between the fee-shifting provision and the securities laws, 
thereby preempting the provision, or the Delaware Chancery Court could find that 
it had an “improper purpose.”75 As discussed below, there is some evidence 
plaintiffs’ lawyers abandoned tort cases for patent litigation in response to state 
tort reform. Additionally, ISS has recently recommended voting, “against bylaws 
that mandate fee-shifting whenever plaintiffs are not completely successful on the 
merits (i.e., in cases where the plaintiffs are partially successful).”76 And as noted 
above, ISS generally recommends against voting for directors who voted to 
unilaterally amend company bylaws without shareholder approval, including 
unilateral amendments affecting litigation rights.77 Because these guidelines were 
recently updated to account for the possible spread of plaintiff pays provisions, it 
remains to be seen whether the boards at the 42 companies that adopted them prior 
to the updates will emerge unscathed. ISS itself has endured significant criticism 
and calls for its regulation by the same groups that have criticized shareholder 
litigation and advocated for fee-shifting and arbitration provisions.78 It is possible 
that under the next Republican \administration in the White House, ISS might see 
its clout decline. Regardless, the fight over these litigation provisions will 
continue. These developments in shareholder litigation increasingly look like 
developments we are seeing in litigation more broadly, specifically, the dilution or 
elimination of class action incentives through litigation and procedural reform.79 It 
is ironic that they should appear now in the shareholder litigation context, 
considering that the international trend runs in precisely the opposite direction. 
Australia, Canada, China, The Netherlands, Germany, Israel, and South Korea 
have all reformed their legal systems to enable the creation of private securities 
class actions.80 Many have done so within the past 10–15 years.81 
But the purpose of this Article is not to make predictions about how the 
investor politics of mandatory-arbitration and fee-shifting provisions will play out 
in the United States, whether corporations will adopt them, or whether some other 
threats to the shareholder class action might emerge. Instead, I begin at the end of 
the story by imagining the elimination of the shareholder class action, and 
predicting what shareholder litigation would look like if the class action 
                                                                                                                
 75. Coffee, supra note 70. 
 76. INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, United States Concise Proxy Voting 
Guidelines: 2015 Benchmark Policy Recommendations 1, 8 (Jan. 7, 2015), available at 
http://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/usconcisevotingguidelines2015.pdf. 
 77. Id. at 4. 
 78. Ryan, supra note 67.  
 79. Burbank & Farhang, supra note 16, at 1613 (“Litigation seeking to narrow 
private rights of action, attorneys’ fee awards, and standing, and to expand arbitration, 
achieved growing rates of voting support from an increasingly conservative Supreme Court, 
particularly over the past two decades.”) 
 80. Paul A. Ferrillo, A New Playbook for Global Securities Litigation and 
Regulation, HARVARD LAW SCH. FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE & FIN. REGULATION 
(Feb. 2, 2012, 9:53 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/02/02/a-new-
playbook-for-global-securities-litigation-and-regulation/. 
 81. Id. 
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disappeared. Much of the critical literature on class actions focuses, quite 
legitimately, on how they fall short of the ideals of deterrence and compensation.82 
Here, I aim to reframe the debate over shareholder class actions by offering what I 
hope is informed speculation about what we would be left with if they vanished. 
There are two purposes to this thought experiment: to imagine the set of possible 
futures for shareholder litigation without class actions and to offer a basis for 
assessing not just how shareholder class actions fall short of the ideals of 
deterrence and compensation, but how they compare to what we will be left with if 
they disappear. 
For the sake of argument, I assume the disappearance of the class action 
through some type of procedural or substantive reform like adoption of mandatory-
arbitration provisions both requiring bilateral arbitration of shareholder claims, and 
barring consolidation of such claims. The purpose of this assumption is to assess 
how loss of a viable collective means of pursuing shareholder claims will change 
the shareholder-litigation landscape. But, because there are many ways for the 
shareholder class action to perish, I try to maintain flexibility in discussing what a 
future litigation landscape would look like without it, regardless of exactly how the 
class action were to disappear.83 Fee-shifting provisions, for example, would 
eliminate the class action not by shifting it into arbitration but by rendering the 
contingency-fee model too risky for any firm to bear. I discuss the economics of 
fee shifting below in Part IV. Fee shifting might effectively eliminate shareholder 
litigation by making only overwhelmingly meritorious cases worth bringing. To be 
sure, the ways in which the shareholder class action might be reduced or 
eliminated vary, and would have important effects on how a post-shareholder-
class-action world would look. But it is not necessary to wait until the exact details 
are known before making some assessment of how class action restrictions would 
change shareholder litigation. In making this assessment, one can become mired in 
describing the many differences between litigation and arbitration generally, 
something which has been debated at great length elsewhere.84 To avoid 
recapitulating these debates here, I aim to confine my analysis to those aspects of 
shareholder litigation and arbitration that are unique to the shareholder context. 
I develop a few main lines of inquiry into the future of shareholder 
litigation under a legal regime that substantially limits, if not effectively 
eliminates, the class action device. First, in Part I, I describe the current landscape 
for shareholder litigation. I then assess what would disappear from it along with 
the class action. For example, I argue that much of transactional litigation would 
be eliminated or would shift into appraisal litigation, depending somewhat on 
whether attorneys’ fees and costs would still be available to plaintiffs. In addition, 
corporate governance reform efforts would all but disappear from these cases, 
                                                                                                                
 82. See, e.g., Scott & Silverman, supra note 15, at 1194–1203 (discussing how 
securities class actions fall short of achieving either deterrence or compensation). 
 83. The content of the arbitration clauses matters, as I discuss in further detail 
below. See discussion infra Part II.B.1. 
 84. See generally Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Making It Up As They Go 
Along: The Role of Law in Securities Arbitration, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 991 (2002). 
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perhaps with a handful of such efforts surviving if companies consent to 
consolidated arbitration proceedings when faced with multiple simultaneous 
arbitrations. Disclosure-only settlements would also likely disappear. While 
disclosure settlements are often viewed as frivolous, there is some empirical 
support for the value of litigated corporate governance reforms.85 
In Part II, I assess what would remain of shareholder litigation. I describe 
how the legal architecture of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(“ERISA”), state pension codes, and the fiduciary duties governing mutual funds, 
banks, and insurance companies would shape institutional investor litigation 
behavior in a post-class-action world—at least for the institutions that could 
plausibly have positive-value claims.86 I articulate how the class action has 
historically benefited institutional investors by reducing their monitoring and 
litigation costs.87 I argue that institutional investors will be required to create 
internal monitoring mechanisms that are likely more costly than those they employ 
now to monitor potential claims in class actions. This is because fund fiduciaries 
are subject to a clear duty to investigate potentially positive-value claims. I further 
argue that the fiduciary standards of ERISA and state pension codes likely compel 
institutions to bring positive-value claims. Fund fiduciaries will retain substantial 
discretion in deciding whether a particular claim is positive or not, and the 
litigation risk faced by a trustee for declining to bring a claim after careful 
deliberation of its merits will be substantially lower than the risk to a trustee for 
failure to investigate the claim.88 How many funds will have such positive-value 
claims, how large those claims will be, and how likely the funds will be to pursue 
them, are three critically important empirical questions. The answers will 
determine whether the death of the securities class action means the death of all 
shareholder litigation, or whether any significant shareholder litigation survives. I 
offer incomplete, but suggestive evidence on this point. Still, for a variety of 
reasons discussed below, courts will be less likely to defer to litigation decisions in 
the shareholder-litigation context than they would be in the context in which 
failure-to-sue claims have ordinarily been brought, that is, against plan sponsors 
for failing to make required contributions.89 And for the most part, such decisions 
will be evaluated under a less-deferential standard than the business judgment 
rule,90 because of the higher fiduciary standards applied under trust law, ERISA, 
and comparable state pension codes. 
In Part III, I discuss the insurance landscape for funds governed by 
ERISA and state pension codes, particularly the latter, which are more restrictive 
                                                                                                                
 85. See infra notes 139–143 and accompanying text for a discussion of pursuing 
corporate governance reforms through shareholder litigation. 
 86. See discussion infra Part II. 
 87. See infra notes 173–176 and accompanying text. 
 88. See infra Part II.B. 
 89. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 90. The business judgment rule “is a presumption that in making a business 
decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the 
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.” Aronson v. 
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).  
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and unpredictable than the directors’ and officers’ insurance with which most 
corporate law scholars and practitioners are familiar. As I demonstrate below, this 
is particularly true for public pension-fund fiduciaries who remain largely 
uninsured and who are told that they are protected from suit by sovereign 
immunity, even though the decision whether to exercise such immunity is beyond 
their control.91 Thus far, the existence of class action settlements whose fairness 
has been certified by a judge has offered fund fiduciaries de facto immunity from 
suit for participating in such settlements.92 The absence of the class action device 
certifying such fairness creates greater unpredictability for fund fiduciaries. This 
should make trustees more sensitive to at least investigate potentially positive-
value claims. Some of the funds that might otherwise have resisted detecting or 
bringing positive-value claims will make these decisions in a less secure and 
predictable insurance environment than that in which directors and officers make 
similar decisions. I also argue that legal uncertainty may contribute to herding 
behavior around arbitration decisions. And I argue that the decline of the 
transactional class action in particular may be offset by, and may enhance, the rise 
of appraisal litigation, particularly of hedge fund participation in such litigation. 
In Part IV, I discuss how loss of the class action device would affect the 
plaintiffs’ bar. I map out a range of scenarios, including the end of the plaintiffs’ 
bar, new competition for plaintiff-side work from the traditional defense bar, and a 
new world of shareholder arbitration in which only elite firms with established 
connections to institutional investors survive, while weaker firms tending to bring 
frivolous cases with individual lead plaintiffs perish. 
Finally, in Part V, I argue that shareholder litigation without class actions 
creates a new market distortion that primarily affects individual investors and 
small institutional investors, what I call the “semi-circularity problem.” Without 
class actions, negative-value claimants will, in all likelihood, lose the ability to 
recover their damages in shareholder litigation.93 But these negative-value 
claimants will still be forced to subsidize the losses of large institutional 
investors—positive-value claimants—to the extent that the negative-value 
claimants own shares in defendant companies that must pay damages claims to 
                                                                                                                
 91. See infra notes 239–250 and accompanying text. 
 92. See infra notes 120–122 and accompanying text. 
 93. Professors Myriam Gilles and Anthony Sebok have proposed two potential 
models under which even small, individual claims might remain economically viable in the 
arbitration context. These models include litigating an initial case in court to establish a 
favorable precedent that could then be used serially in arbitration, and utilizing “arbitration 
entrepreneurs” to purchase small claims and arbitrate them in one action. Myriam Gilles & 
Anthony Sebok, Crowd Classing Individual Arbitrations In A Post-Class Action Era, 63 
DEPAUL L. REV. 447, 456–57 (2012). Both of these models seem plausible, though the 
authors themselves caution, “[n]either is a sure bet; both face serious challenges, and even if 
used in tandem by sophisticated legal risk takers, these approaches do not provide a very 
satisfactory substitute for class action litigation.” Id. at 483. Also, if boards unilaterally 
adopt mandatory-arbitration provisions, there will be no opportunity to litigate that initial 
case in court for purposes of establishing a favorable legal precedent, because that initial 
suit will have to be arbitrated, like all the rest. 
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institutional investor plaintiffs.94 Loss of the class action device enshrines this 
semi-circularity problem into our law, creating a two-tier legal system for 
investors—one in which, from the same fraud (or mispriced deal), large 
institutions recover damages while individuals and small institutions do not, and 
one in which small investors must reach farther into their pockets to compensate 
large institutional losses for that fraud (or mispriced deal). I argue that this 
development cuts to the heart of one core purpose of securities regulation: the idea 
of maintaining a level legal and informational playing field between investors. I 
also argue that the end of the class action means abandonment of the idea that 
investors should be compensated for losses due to fraud or other corporate 
malfeasance, and I demonstrate that loss of the class action leaves investors in 
smaller firms with no remedy for wrongdoing. It is true that compensation for such 
harm is already quite small, and its loss might not be missed. But it creates 
potentially unwelcome incentives favoring large institutional investors over 
smaller institutions and individuals, rather than maintaining a traditionally more 
level legal playing field for such investors, regardless of size.  
I. THE LITIGATION LANDSCAPE FOR INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, 
WITH AND WITHOUT CLASS ACTIONS 
In the past decade, public-pension funds and labor-union funds have 
obtained lead plaintiff appointments in approximately 40% of both securities-fraud 
and transactional class actions.95 Active institutional leadership of these class 
actions has not always been the norm, but two legal reforms facilitated this change. 
At the federal level, the PSLRA created a rebuttable presumption—appointing the 
applicant with the largest loss in the purported fraud as lead plaintiff.96 This reform 
was designed to encourage institutional leadership of class actions because, due to 
their sizable assets, institutions were most likely to have the largest losses.97 In 
                                                                                                                
 94.  John C. Coffee, Jr., Accountability and Competition in Securities Class 
Actions: Why “Exit” Works Better than “Voice,” 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 407, 409 (2008) 
(“Typically, the members of the plaintiff class are paid the settlement by the corporation 
(and not by the individual defendants). As a result, the cost of recovery falls primarily on 
those shareholders who are not in the class.”).  
 95. See Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, On Beyond CalPERS: Survey Evidence 
on the Developing Role of Public Pension Funds in Corporate Governance, 61 VAND. L. 
REV. 315 (2008); Michael A. Perino, Institutional Activism Through Litigation: An 
Empirical Assessment of Public Pension Fund Participation in Securities Class Actions, 9 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 363 (2012); David H. Webber, Private Policing of Mergers and 
Acquisitions: An Empirical Assessment of Institutional Lead Plaintiffs in Transactional 
Class and Derivative Actions, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 907, 934 (2014) (institutions obtain 41% 
of lead plaintiff appointments in Delaware transactional litigation) [hereinafter Webber, 
Private Policing]. 
 96. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(iii) (2012) (“[T]he court shall adopt a 
presumption that the most adequate plaintiff in any private action arising under this 
subchapter is the person or group of persons that . . . in the determination of the court, has 
the largest financial interest in the relief sought by the class . . . .”). 
 97. See R. Chris Heck, Conflict and Aggregation: Appointing Institutional 
Investors as Sole Lead Plaintiffs Under the PSLRA, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1204 (1999) 
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theory, institutional investor lead plaintiffs would carefully and skillfully monitor 
class counsel, because they would be motivated by their large loss to seek a 
substantial recovery, and because they are sophisticated enough to police the 
lawyers’ conduct in the litigation.98 Several years later, the Delaware Chancery 
Court—the traditional forum for transactional class actions99—adopted similar 
criteria favoring the selection of institutional investor lead plaintiffs.100 Following 
these reforms, some institutional investors began participating as lead plaintiffs in 
both federal securities-fraud and Delaware transactional class actions. Mutual 
funds and hedge funds avoided taking an active role in these suits, rarely serving 
as lead plaintiffs, whereas public-pension and labor-union funds frequently 
obtained lead-plaintiff appointments.101  
Mutual funds have $15 trillion assets under management; Fidelity, 
Vanguard, and TIAA-CREF are some of the largest institutional investors in the 
world, and undoubtedly have enough exposure to obtain lead-plaintiff 
appointments if they pursue them.102 But they don’t. First, such funds are 
concerned about the cost of freeriding competitors, who are also likely to be class 
                                                                                                                
(“The core of [Weiss & Beckerman’s] argument is that, unlike individual investors who 
often stand to recover only small amounts from securities fraud litigation, institutions are 
likely to have suffered large losses from fraud.”). 
 98. Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: 
How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 
YALE L.J. 2053, 2095 (1995) (“Institutions’ large stakes give them an incentive to monitor, 
and institutions have or readily could develop the expertise necessary to assess whether 
plaintiffs’ attorneys are acting as faithful champions for the plaintiff class.”). 
 99. See John Armour et al., Is Delaware Losing Its Cases? 1 (Univ. Tex. Law, 
Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 174 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1578404 
(offering evidence that transactional class actions have been leaving Delaware). But see 
Adam B. Badawi, Merger Class Actions in Delaware and the Symptoms of Multi-
Jurisdictional Litigation, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 965, 967 (2013) (suggesting return of 
transactional class actions to Delaware). 
 100. Hirt v. U.S. Timberlands Serv. Co., No. CIV.A. 19575, 2002 WL1558342, at 
*2 (Del. Ch. July 3, 2002); TCW Tech. Ltd. P’ship v. Intermedia Commc’ns, Inc., No. 
18336, 18289, 18293, 2000 WL 1654504, at *4 (Del. Ch. Oct. 17, 2000); Webber, Private 
Policing, supra note 95, at 910. 
 101. I have written extensively about why certain fund types avoid leadership 
roles in these suits while others embrace them. See Webber, Private Policing, supra note 
95, at 935 (discussing an empirical study of institutional lead plaintiffs from 2003 to 2009 in 
Delaware). I summarize the discussion in this paper because understanding the litigation 
dynamics faced by institutional investors in a world with class actions is crucial to 
understanding how those dynamics would change if the class action world disappeared.  
 102. Compare INV. CO. INST., 2014 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK (54th ed. 
2014), available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/2014_factbook.pdf (reporting that there were $15 
trillion invested in mutual funds worldwide in 2013), with U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2012, 753 tbl. 1217 (2012), available at 
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s1219.pdf (reporting that there 
were $2.928 trillion invested by state and local public-pension funds in 2010). 
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members.103 To the extent that serving as lead plaintiff incurs costs, even 
reimbursable costs, mutual funds might prefer to remain as passive class members 
for fear of incurring costs for themselves while conferring benefits on those 
competitors.104 Because the PSLRA bars bonus payments for lead plaintiffs, 
limiting lead-plaintiff recoveries to the lead plaintiff’s pro rata share of losses, 
funds concerned about freeriding competitors may rationally decline to pursue 
lead-plaintiff appointments, even if their own recoveries would improve by 
assuming a leadership role in the suit.105 
There are several other reasons why mutual funds avoid the lead-plaintiff 
role: 
First, a substantial component of the mutual fund business consists 
of investing the 401(k) retirement savings of public company 
employees. These funds will not want to jeopardize this business by 
suing their customers, the corporate boards, and corporate managers 
that select which mutual fund options to offer their employees. 
Second, mutual funds may also avoid litigation for “social network” 
reasons. Unlike the firefighters, police officers, and teachers who sit 
on the boards of trustees of public-pension funds, mutual fund 
managers are more likely to travel in the same business, social, and 
educational circles as do corporate managers and directors. Such 
social-network effects may reduce their participation in aggressive 
activism “within the circle.” Because mutual funds diversify their 
investments, the kind of activism that would be logical for them to 
pursue bears a closer resemblance to that undertaken by public-
pension funds, which is based in part on a strategy of pursuing 
change at a broad swath of companies, and thereby potentially 
alienating many people within the social network. In addition, as 
relayed to me by a director of corporate governance and associate 
general counsel at a top mutual fund, such funds avoid leading 
activist campaigns because their financial analysts prize, and guard, 
their access to senior corporate managers. Such analysts prefer that 
their employers avoid actions that might alienate corporate 
managers who might then refuse to respond to their inquiries. This 
is not to say that mutual funds engage in no activism. But they 
usually allow public-pension funds and labor-union funds to take 
                                                                                                                
 103. See Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional 
Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 461–62 (1991) (discussing the free rider problem 
and its benefits). 
 104. See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate 
Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1052–54 (2007) (concluding 
that shareholder activism only benefits a mutual fund “to the extent that the fund has a 
higher stake in the portfolio company (relative to the fund size) than competing funds do 
and the costs of activism are less than the profits from that differential”). 
 105. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(4) (2012) (“The share of any final judgment or of any 
settlement that is awarded to a representative party serving on behalf of a class shall be 
equal, on a per share basis, to the portion of the final judgment or settlement awarded to all 
other members of the class.”). 
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the lead, to become the public face of activist initiatives, following 
the lead of these funds by occasionally voting in favor of their 
activist initiatives. Finally, different mutual fund managers within 
the same mutual fund family may hold different stakes in the target 
and bidder companies, and may have adverse interests in the 
outcome of the suit. Engaging in litigation or activism may raise 
conflicts within the mutual fund family. Thus, free-riding 
competitors, business conflicts, social-network conflicts, and 
conflicts within mutual fund families all deter mutual funds from 
obtaining lead plaintiff appointments.106 
Similar conflicts exist for other large private, diversified investors—like 
banks, insurance companies, and endowments—which rarely assume lead-plaintiff 
appointments.107 
Hedge funds also avoid the lead-plaintiff role due to freeriding concerns. 
In addition, hedge funds tend to be secretive about their trading strategies and, 
thus, may be reluctant to subject themselves to the type of discovery that lead 
plaintiffs typically endure.108 As I discuss further below, the existence of class 
actions allows such funds to remain passive in the face of known positive-value 
claims, because the claims will be resolved in a class action, for which the funds 
can collect their pro rata share of losses.109 Elimination of the class action may 
place such funds in more of a legal quandary than they currently face with regard 
to litigation. 
In contrast to mutual funds and hedge funds, the free-rider problem is of 
less concern to public-pension funds and labor-union funds. This is because these 
funds lack true competitors.110 I proposed in Private Policing that these funds lack 
true competitors: 
                                                                                                                
 106. Webber, Private Policing, supra note 95, at 941–43. 
 107. See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through Your 
Fingers: Empirical Evidence and Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial Institutions 
to Participate in Securities Class Action Settlements, 58 STAN. L. REV. 411, 415 (2005) 
(“[P]rivate and public-pension funds, [such as] life and casualty insurance companies, 
mutual funds, bank trust departments, and various endowments . . . share a common bond: 
wise stewardship of the portfolio managed by each financial institution redounds to the 
benefit of another, be that person a pensioner, policyholder, stockholder, beneficiary, or 
even a faculty member. For this reason, the managers of each type of financial institution 
are subject to variously expressed fiduciary obligations that compel their prudent 
stewardship of their portfolio.”). 
 108. See, e.g., Hedge Fund Trading Styles Overview, MACROPTION, 
http://www.macroption.com/hedge-fund-trading-styles-overview/ (last visited Oct. 14, 
2014) (“Due to tough competition, a viable [hedge fund] trading strategy requires a lot of 
details and nuances . . . . Hedge fund managers often keep their trading strategies secret to 
preserve their competitive advantage and the strategy’s profitability.”). 
 109. See infra notes 120–121 and accompanying text. 
 110. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 104, at 1065–66 (discussing the strategic and 
financial reasons that contribute to a hedge funds ability to “not worry much about 
competitor funds free riding on their governance activism and getting higher returns with 
lower costs”). 
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Individuals employed by a state or local government entity, or in 
certain capacities by a private company, have their retirement 
savings automatically invested in the public-pension fund or labor-
union fund associated with their employer. If a fund beneficiary is 
unhappy with the fund’s performance, the beneficiary’s only option 
is to change jobs, not move one’s retirement savings to a 
competitor. Thus, while public-pension funds and labor-union funds 
still face the free rider problem when serving as lead plaintiffs, or 
engaging in any activism, they incur fewer costs from such free 
riding than do mutual funds.111 
These funds are able to incur lower costs because they do not experience 
“outflows” (or “inflows”) on a quarterly or yearly basis in response to fund 
performance.112 Such funds are also not dependent on revenues from class action 
defendants (such as the fees mutual funds earn for managing defendant 401k 
plans). Public-pension funds are funded by government employers and 
employees,113 while labor-union funds are funded by private employers and 
workers, and face fewer economic constraints on suing companies other than their 
own employers.114 Thus, public-pension funds and labor-union funds lack the 
major disincentives to participate in these suits that prevent mutual- and hedge-
fund participation. Their substantial involvement as lead plaintiffs may also be 
explained by their prior success in bringing such suits. Public-pension lead 
plaintiffs have been found to correlate with higher recoveries and lower attorneys’ 
fees in both securities-fraud and transactional class actions.115 Many of these funds 
have also signed up for portfolio monitoring by plaintiffs’ law firms.116 Outside 
law firms directly monitor the portfolios of such funds for exposure to securities 
fraud or transactional claims, placing the funds on notice that they may be eligible 
to serve as lead plaintiffs in such actions.117 
Two benefits of the class action device described above are that: it lets 
these institutions recover for claims that would otherwise be negative-value and it 
                                                                                                                
 111. David H. Webber, The Plight of the Individual Investor in Securities Class 
Actions, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 157, 206 (2012) [hereinafter Webber, Plight]. 
 112. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 104, at 1052–53. 
 113. Jonathan Barry Forman, Funding Public Pension Plans, 42 J. MARSHALL L. 
REV. 837, 837 (2010) (“State and local government employers typically fund . . . pension 
plans through a combination of employer and employee contributions . . . .”). 
 114.  David H. Webber, Is “Pay-to-Play” Driving Public-Pension Fund Class 
Activism in Securities Class Actions?, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2031, 2071–72 (2010) [hereinafter 
Webber, Pay-to-Play] (describing the role unions play in securities actions). 
 115. C.S. Agnes Cheng, et al., Institutional Monitoring Through Shareholder 
Litigation, 95 J. FIN. ECON. 356, 356–62 (2010) (using a database from 1996 to 2005 and 
controlling for case determinants of having an institutional lead plaintiff, found that 
institutional investors, including public-pension funds, decrease the probability of a case 
being dismissed, increase monetary recoveries, and improve the independence of boards at 
defendant companies); Perino, supra note 95; Webber, Private Policing, supra note 95, at 
924–25. 
 116. Webber, Plight, supra note 111, at 167. 
 117. Id. (describing the benefits of having plaintiffs’ firms monitor portfolios). 
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lets them choose to remain passive about positive-value claims. There are more 
than 4,000 public-pension funds in the United States.118 Obviously, the vast 
majority are not going to lead class actions, even if they wanted to. In a prior 
study, I found that 79 public-pension funds had obtained a lead-plaintiff 
appointment between 2003 and 2006, and that 20 of the 53 largest funds by asset 
size had obtained at least one lead-plaintiff appointment.119 Thus, the vast majority 
of public-pension funds—and even a simple majority of the very largest public 
pensions (with $10 billion or more in assets) that are most likely to have positive-
value claims—remain passive in class actions.  
Passivity has its benefits. It reduces the cost of monitoring and litigating a 
claim. Funds can remain passive because when they are exposed to a purported 
fraud or a rigged transaction, it is nearly certain that a class action will be filed.120 
Therefore, there is almost nothing that a fund must do with regard to its claim 
other than file a claim form to recover in the class action.121 As a theoretical 
matter, it is true that fiduciaries should review the size of their claim and consider 
opting out, rather than remaining class members.122 But as a practical matter, the 
                                                                                                                
 118. Survey of Public Pensions: State- and Locally-Administered Defined Benefit 
Data, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/govs/retire/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2014) 
(“There were 227 state-administered and 3,771 locally-administered defined public pension 
systems . . . .”). 
 119. Webber, Pay to Play, supra note 114. 
 120. It is true, as a theoretical matter, that a fund could have a positive-value 
claim for securities fraud or a Revlon violation in which no class action has been filed. But 
most of the evidence points to an excess rather than a dearth of class actions, at least in deal 
cases. See Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Great Game: The Dynamics of 
State Competition and Litigation, 99 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1984758. I have found no examples of pension trustees being sued 
for failing to bring a positive-value claim for securities fraud or Revlon, though that could 
change if the class action disappears, as I argue in Part II.A. 
 121. Of course, the institution must still follow through and actually file the claim 
to recover its pro rata share of the settlement. In two surprising and revealing studies, Cox 
and Thomas demonstrated that a large percentage of institutional investors failed to file 
claims for their pro rata shares of securities class action settlements. See Cox & Thomas, 
supra note 107. Cox and Thomas argued that such a failure to file claims constituted a 
breach of the duty of care. James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Leaving Money on the 
Table: Do Institutional Investors Fail to File Claims in Securities Class Actions?, 80 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 855 (2002). In so doing, they surveyed a broad array of institutional investor 
types—ranging from public-pension funds, labor-union funds, and mutual funds, to 
insurance companies, banks, and others—to argue the potential consequences to them of 
failing to file a claim, or failing to seek a lead plaintiff appointment. They based their 
argument, in part, on Chancellor Allen’s opinion in In re Caremark International Inc. 
Derivative Litigation, stating that directors have “a good faith [duty] to be informed and to 
exercise appropriate judgment . . . .” In re Caremark Int’l, Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d. 
959, 968 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 122. Securities Litigation Settlement Costs if Large Shareholders Opt Out, CRA 
INSIGHTS: FIN. MARKETS (June 2013), 
http://www.crai.com/sites/default/files/publications/Securities-litigation-settlement-costs-if-
large-shareholders-opt-out.pdf (“[O]pting out of a class may considerably increase the 
recovery in certain securities litigation. However, opting out . . . involves bearing the costs 
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risk of a fiduciary being held liable for failing to opt out is close to zero.123 That is 
because the institutions’ passive participation is ratified by judicial approval of 
both class certification and class settlement. Such approval offers almost complete 
immunity to fund boards for any claim that the board failed to identify or to litigate 
a positive-value claim; claims which could be made by fund participants and 
beneficiaries, fund investors, government entities like the U.S. Department of 
Labor for funds governed by ERISA, or state attorneys general. As long as the 
fund filed its claim form, the potential defendants in such an action can claim that 
the recovery it obtained was certified as fair by a judge. There would seem to be 
no better defense to a breach of fiduciary duty claim than the argument that a judge 
certified that the collected settlement was fair. The only cases in which fund 
boards have been sued for failing to opt out of a class action are those involving 
unique and exceptional circumstances.124 
Elimination of the class action removes this legal insulation for fund 
boards, exposing them more directly to liability for failure to identify, or litigate, 
positive-value claims. In the next Part, I discuss the requirement that fiduciaries 
monitor their portfolios for potential claims, their duty to act on positive-value 
claims, and how each of these duties will become more expensive and time 
consuming in the absence of a class action regime. Of course, active, 
individualized pursuit of such claims could also result in better recoveries to the 
fund—a point I consider further below.125 The point here is that, if the class action 
disappears, many institutional investors that passively participate in class actions 
by collecting their pro rata share of settlements—like mutual funds, banks, and 
insurance companies—may be forced to vindicate their fiduciary duties by 
monitoring their portfolios for positive-value claims and potentially acting on 
those claims. While such entities may not wish to devote resources to these 
endeavors, it’s not clear that this development would be wholly unwelcome. 
Litigation by sophisticated players like these could not only improve their own 
recoveries in class actions, but could have positive externalities (like deterrence) 
for other investors, including individual investors. But before turning to what 
institutions will do in the absence of a class action, and consequently what 
litigation will survive, I discuss briefly what litigation will disappear without the 
class action device. 
                                                                                                                
of filing and pursuing litigation, the publicizing of potentially embarrassing internal analysis 
and communications, and the risk that the claims may be dismissed due to specific 
individual issues.”). 
 123. Harris v. Koenig, 602 F. Supp. 2d 39, 48 (D.D.C. 2009) (denying in part 
motion to dismiss ERISA breach of fiduciary duty claims against pension fiduciaries and 
sponsor for, inter alia, “failing to conduct an adequate review and evaluation of the fairness 
of the [securities class action] settlement . . . in light of The Plan’s unique ERISA claims”). 
 124. See infra text accompanying note 163. 
 125. See supra note 122. 
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II. HOW LOSS OF THE CLASS ACTION WILL RESHAPE SECURITIES 
LITIGATION 
A. What Disappears 
It is possible that virtually all private-shareholder litigation will disappear 
without the class action. Even claimants with large losses that would more than 
justify the ordinary litigation costs might balk at the contingent liability of paying 
defendants’ legal bills in the presence of a plaintiff-pays provision. The 
unpredictability of arbitration awards could similarly lead potential plaintiffs with 
sizeable claims to demur litigation. These points are debatable, and I address them 
more fully in the next Part, where I explore the options for institutional investors 
with large losses in a post-class-action world. In this Section, I focus on what will 
most certainly be eliminated from shareholder litigation without the class action, 
including the pursuit of corporate governance reform, most M&A litigation in its 
current form, and most of the positive externalities of litigation, which, in many 
respects, outweigh the positive externalities of arbitration. 
If courts were to uphold mandatory-arbitration provisions in corporate 
bylaws, particularly bylaws that would require bilateral arbitration and bar 
consolidation of claims, this would eliminate the shareholder class action for any 
company that adopted them.126 This would bar redress for most investors with 
negative-value claims against the company. Because these cases are expensive to 
litigate or arbitrate, most claims by individual investors would become 
economically unviable, as would most claims by institutional investors that have 
low stakes in particular companies. It is true that some negative-value claims 
might still be brought. The literature on negative-value claims suggests that they 
still have settlement value because it might be cheaper for defendants to settle 
rather than litigate a case that they are certain to win.127 Also, informational 
asymmetries may make the plaintiffs’ threat to take the case to trial credible, 
particularly when they have private information about damages.128 Still, the 
economic models that explore the bringing of negative-value suits envision 
problems like the defendants’ lack of information about the plaintiffs’ damages. In 
securities-fraud suits, the damages are transparent. The defendants know exactly 
what the claimed losses can be, because the stock price drop is public. The only 
information they lack is how many shares the plaintiffs own. To prevent 
defendants from settling securities-fraud cases due to discovery costs, Congress 
                                                                                                                
 126. See supra text accompanying notes 22–36. 
 127. See Randy J. Kozel & David Rosenberg, Solving the Nuisance-Value 
Settlement Problem: Mandatory Summary Judgment, 90 VA. L. REV. 1849, 1856 (2004) (“A 
profit maximizing defendant rationally would settle for any amount up to the cost of 
defeating the plaintiff’s claim.”); David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Model In Which 
Suits Are Brought for Their Nuisance Value, 5 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1985). 
 128. Lucian Arye Bebchuck, Suing Solely To Extract A Settlement Offer, 17 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 437, 440 (1986).  
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banned discovery prior to the motion to dismiss in the PSLRA.129 Moreover, these 
lawsuits are dominated by repeat players, experts who often litigate nothing other 
than securities-fraud and merger class actions. The lawyers can easily size up the 
comparative strength of their opponents’ position. Plaintiffs with negative-value 
claims are more poorly positioned to extract settlements in the shareholder 
litigation context than they might be in the generic litigation context because 
defense lawyers are so often sophisticated repeat players. It is also true that large 
institutional investors that can afford the legal fees might still bring negative-value 
claims if they believe it will help discipline managers, although free-rider 
problems could hamper such efforts. Most likely, negative-value claimants would 
be left with no recourse for fraud, and the overall damages claims in securities-
fraud cases would drop substantially.130 Loss of the class action would eliminate 
more than just negative-value claims. It would also substantially reduce, and 
possibly eliminate, actions and remedies that are only rationally pursued in the 
class action context, even by investors with positive-value claims. 
For example, corporate governance reform has been pursued in the class 
action context, rarely as the primary objective of such litigation, but as an 
alternative to damages or other relief.131 Governance reform is rooted in the idea 
that increasing managerial accountability to shareholders improves firm value and 
share price.132 Declassifying boards, creating a shareholder director-nomination 
committee, and splitting the role of the CEO and the Chairman of the Board, are 
all examples of governance reforms that tend to be pursued in litigation.133 To the 
extent that they improve the investment’s value, investors that hold shares in the 
defendant company post-fraud might benefit from such reforms. In the class action 
context, the class’s damages may be large enough to materially harm the 
company—thus, shareholders with an ongoing stake in the defendant corporation 
                                                                                                                
 129. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (West 2014) (“In any private action arising 
under this chapter, all discovery and other proceedings shall be stayed during the pendency 
of any motion to dismiss, unless the court finds upon the motion of any party that 
particularized discovery is necessary to preserve evidence or to prevent undue prejudice to 
that party.”). 
 130. As described more fully below in Part II.B, damages claims must be 
distinguished from damages awarded. There is some evidence that institutional investors 
who have opted out of class actions have obtained substantially higher recoveries as a 
percentage of their losses than are normally obtained in class actions, suggesting that 
damages awarded might not drop as far as damages claimed in a post-class-action world. 
 131. See, e.g., In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 219 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(noting as a cause for objection that “the lead plaintiff negotiated as part of the settlement 
certain governance changes”). 
 132. See generally Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, What Matters 
in Corporate Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 783 (2009). 
 133. See, e.g., In re United Health Grp. Inc. PSLRA Litig., 643 F. Supp. 2d 1094 
(D. Minn. 2008); Press Release, CalPERS, UnitedHealth Group Reach $895 Million 
Settlement in Class-Action Case – Includes Landmark Corporate Governance Reforms (July 
2, 2008), http://www.calpers-governance.org/marketinitiatives/initiatives/press-
releases/unitedhealth-reach-settlement; Cendant, 264 F.3d at 246. 
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might prefer governance reform to the maximum immediate damages payment.134 
But that is no longer true when institutional investors separately arbitrate their 
fraud claims. No single investor’s claim can threaten a large publically traded 
company the way a class action can. And even if the separate arbitration of many 
institutional investors add up to damages that could materially harm the defendant, 
each plaintiff faces a prisoner’s dilemma, it will not reduce its own claim in the 
hope that others will do the same and thus it is rational for a plaintiff to seek the 
largest damage claim it can get. Each institution also faces the free-rider problem 
in seeking governance reform. If it arbitrates such reform, all investors would 
benefit, in contrast to a damages payment made directly and solely to the 
arbitrating plaintiff in compensation for its losses. Finally, even if an institution 
were to seek reform in arbitration, it is doubtful that a defendant would agree to it, 
because the plaintiff cannot speak for the whole class of shareholders and therefore 
cannot bind it to one set of reforms.135 A defendant could theoretically face 
multiple, conflicting reform proposals from multiple arbitration plaintiffs. 
Lawsuits seeking governance reforms are often depicted as frivolous, 
although one might draw a distinction between cases in which reform is the only 
remedy versus cases in which reform is a small part of the remedy. In the case of 
the former, while reforms might plausibly be value enhancing, there is justifiable 
concern that they might be largely cosmetic, designed to justify a legal fee rather 
than enhance value. In contrast, consider a case like the UnitedHealth Stock 
Options Backdating case (full disclosure: I worked on this case). There, the cases 
settled for $970 million and governance reforms like splitting the role of CEO and 
Chair and reforming the compensation committee to prevent the corporate 
breakdown that led to backdating in the first place. Perhaps I am biased because of 
my own work on this case, but it strikes me as plausible that the reforms secured in 
this case could have had a salutary effect on governance that would have helped 
the company avoid future accounting improprieties. Regardless, for the reasons 
just described, it is difficult to see how such reforms might be pursued in the 
arbitration context.136  
                                                                                                                
 134. Cendant, 264 F.3d at 243 (arguing that “a lead plaintiff who retains a 
substantial investment in a defendant corporation . . . will naturally be conflicted between 
trying to get maximum recovery for the class and trying to protect its ongoing investment in 
the corporation”). 
 135. Cf. Black & Gross, supra note 84, at 992 (noting that arbitration awards “do 
not serve as precedent—future arbitration panels cannot rely on previous awards as a source 
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 136. One potential exception to the above description would be if institutions 
pursued, or if defendants consented to, consolidated arbitration cases. Consolidated 
arbitration is distinct from class arbitration. In class arbitration, as with the class action, self-
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one recent case, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts v. BCS Insurance Co., the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit declined to hear an interlocutory appeal from a 
defendant seeking to deconsolidate an arbitration proceeding, reasoning that, under Animal 
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For similar reasons, disclosure-only settlements in mergers and 
acquisitions (“M&A”) cases will likely die with the class action. In such actions, 
plaintiff shareholders obtain additional disclosure about the deal in the proxy 
statement.137 Theoretically, such disclosures allow shareholders to make a better-
informed decision about whether to vote in favor of the merger. In practice, such 
settlements have been widely derided as frivolous.138 The additional disclosures 
are often economically insignificant.139 A recent study found that 85% of all 
transactional class actions result in disclosure-only settlements, and that additional 
disclosures have no measurable impact on shareholder voting.140 This undermines 
                                                                                                                
Feeds, it could not proceed in consolidated form without the defendant’s consent. 671 F.3d 
635, 636–38 (7th Cir. 2011). The court denied the appeal on procedural grounds, pointing to 
the movants’ failure to raise the issue at the outset of the arbitration, prior to selection of the 
first arbitrator. Id. at 638. Professors Myriam Gilles and Anthony Sebok have pointed out 
that, “the rules governing the dominant arbitral bodies do not provide for consolidation of 
related cases before a single arbitrator, nor is there any intra-arbitration res judicata effect 
awarded to prior victories.” Myriam Gilles & Anthony Sebok, Crowd Classing Individual 
Arbitrations In A Post-Class Action Era, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 447, 449 (2012). Arbitrators 
could also decide to grant prior arbitration awards preclusive effect, but they are not 
required to do so. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 671 F.3d at 639 (“Not even BCS denies that a 
panel of arbitrators could resolve one plan’s claim and then apply that decision to the others 
via doctrines of claim preclusion or issue preclusion.”); see also Bhd. of Maint. of Way 
Emps. v. Burlington N. R.R., 24 F.3d 937 (7th Cir. 1994); Prod. & Maint. Emps. v. 
Roadmaster Corp., 916 F.2d 1161 (7th Cir. 1990). Consolidation is available under the rules 
of the London Court of International Arbitration or the International Chamber of 
Commerce, and may remain a viable option, as indicated in Blue Cross Blue Shield. See 
LCIA Rules, Art. 22; ICC Rules, Art. 10; Blue Cross Blue Shield, 671 F.3d at 640. Boards 
revising their corporate bylaws to require arbitration of claims against them or the company 
will likely draft those bylaws to bar the possibility of consolidation, thereby eliminating 
negative-value claims. Permitting consolidation would defeat the purpose of adopting the 
clause in the first place, because, in this context, the purpose of such clauses is not to shift 
shareholder litigation from courts to arbitrators, but to eliminate the claims altogether by 
undermining their economic viability. Yet it is possible that companies facing simultaneous 
arbitrations against large institutional investors might waive their right to oppose 
consolidation vis-à-vis those investors if it reduced their own costs to do so. Should this 
occur, some corporate governance reform in litigation/arbitration might be preserved, 
should the consolidated institutions choose to pursue it in this context. 
 137. See generally Phillip R. Sumpter, Adjusting Attorney’s Fee Awards: The 
Delaware Court of Chancery’s Answer to Incentivizing Meritorious Disclosure-Only 
Statements, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 669, 676–81 (2013). 
 138. Id. at 689 (discussing the court’s criticism of disclosure-only settlements). 
 139. Id. at 674 (“[T]he Court has noted that there is a disturbing trend where 
plaintiffs viciously attack a deal and then settle for only marginal disclosures . . . . 
Additional criticism targets the problem that deal litigation often nitpicks otherwise good 
disclosures.”). 
 140. Steven Davidoff Solomon, et al., Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in 
Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, TEX. L. REV. 
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 24), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2398023. 
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the argument that such disclosures are value enhancing.141 Even if one takes the 
view that such disclosure-only settlements are value enhancing, it is difficult to 
discern how they would remain economically feasible without the class action 
device. Because of the evidence suggesting that such disclosure is likely useless, 
elimination of such suits is an argument in favor of mandatory-arbitration or fee-
shifting provisions. For similar reasons, amendment lawsuits would also be 
eliminated in arbitration. In amendment suits, the defendants amend the terms of 
the merger agreement, presumably to make it easier for a second bidder to 
emerge.142 The literature on such suits is more favorable than disclosure-only suits, 
although it is difficult to price their actual value, and hence difficult to assess the 
harm caused by their loss.143 Moving beyond disclosure and amendment 
settlements, clearly meritorious M&A litigation that results in an increase in price 
for target shareholders might also face extinction in the face of mandatory-
arbitration provisions. Part of the problem stems from loss of the class action, and 
part from the loss of access to courts. Most of the plaintiffs’ leverage in deal 
litigation derives from the threat of obtaining a court-ordered injunction 
postponing the shareholder vote, without which the deal cannot close. Deals often 
cannot close without shareholder approval, and thus the threat of an injunction 
may make defendants improve the offer price or make concessions regarding the 
bidding process.144 Denial of the injunction means the deal will most likely close 
without a remedy for shareholders, leaving only the ex post remedies of litigation. 
Arbitrators lack the power to issue injunctions (unless the parties grant them that 
power), thereby depriving plaintiff shareholders of their strongest leverage. Even if 
an arbitrator would be empowered to issue an injunction, it is not clear how a 
single institutional investor—acting alone, rather than in a representative 
capacity—would have standing to enjoin a shareholder vote, which is a class-wide 
remedy. Finally, even if a single institution could obtain such an injunction in the 
face of a loser-pays or plaintiff-pays provision, the free-rider problem persists: 
there is no incentive for a single institutional investor to incur all litigation costs in 
order to benefit all other investors, including its competitors. Instead, it will pursue 
a monetary claim on its own behalf alone, if at all. Such funds might shift into 
bringing appraisal claims.145  
                                                                                                                
 141. Cain & Solomon, supra note 120 (manuscript at 16) (discussing “the 
principle that ‘disclosure-only’ settlements are not highly valued by the litigant participants 
or the courts”); see also Solomon et al., supra note 140 (manuscript at 4). 
 142. Solomon et al., supra note 140 (manuscript at 3). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Robert M. Daines & Olga Koumrian, Shareholder Litigation Involving 
Mergers and Acquisitions, Review of 2012 M&A Litigation, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH 
(February 2013), https://www.cornerstone.com/getattachment/9d8fd78f-7807-485a-a8fc-
4ec4182dedd6/Shareholder-Litigation-Involving-Mergers-and-Acqui.aspx. 
 145. Shareholders who abstained or voted no in a merger agreement have the 
option of foregoing the merger consideration and filing an appraisal claim requesting a 
judicial proceeding to determine the fair value of their shares. See Charles Korsmo & Minor 
Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage and the Future of Public Company M&A, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 23), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2424935. 
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Beyond loss of the injunction, the dynamics of M&A litigation remain 
largely similar to those described for securities-fraud litigation above, with one 
potentially significant difference. In contrast to fraud litigation, deal litigation is 
about deprived gains, not incurred losses. To the extent that loss aversion146 makes 
trustees, fund participants, and beneficiaries more sensitive to frauds than reduced 
premiums, marginally positive deal cases may be less likely to be brought than 
marginally positive fraud cases. This dynamic may already exist under the status 
quo. Otherwise, the institutional dynamics remain quite similar in both deal and 
fraud cases. As I found in a prior study, public-pension and labor-union funds are 
more likely attain lead-plaintiff appointments in deal cases,147 and in a post-class-
action world would likely continue to be the most active participants—be it pursuit 
of breach of fiduciary duty or perhaps appraisal claims in the arbitration context. 
The latter would not be unprecedented; witness T. Rowe Price’s recent pursuit of 
appraisal in the management buyout of Dell.148 Recent evidence suggests that 
mutual funds have increasingly brought appraisal actions.149 Hedge funds have 
also become active appraisal litigants, prompting questions about the rise of 
“appraisal arbitration” as a viable trading strategy.150 Appraisal is a narrow 
remedy, potentially offering a higher price to shareholders who believe they were 
paid too little for their shares, but depriving them of the potential to stop a deal, or 
to improve the informational environment for shareholders.151 
Thus, mandatory arbitration eliminates negative-value claims, and even 
certain substantive claims and remedies by positive-value claimants. Apart from 
eliminating types of claims, it is important to note what else disappears with loss 
of the class action. To the extent that arbitration provisions keep these actions out 
of court, or that plaintiff-pays provisions keep these actions from being heard in 
any forum, many of the positive externalities of litigation disappear or are 
substantially limited. First and foremost is the production of a relevant, current, 
and vibrant body of corporate case law, described by one commentator as the 
“decree effect.”152 As has so often been observed, the ongoing publication of legal 
                                                                                                                
 146. Loss aversion is the principle that people prefer avoiding loss to acquiring 
gains. Eyal Zamir, Loss Aversion and the Law, 65 VAND. L. REV. 829, 838 (2012). 
 147. Webber, Pay to Play, supra note 114, at 2033 (“In recent years, [public 
pension] funds, or their sister union funds, have obtained as much as forty percent of lead-
plaintiff appointments in securities class actions.”). 
 148. Steven Davidoff Solomon, A New Form of Shareholder Activism Gains 
Momentum, N.Y. TIMES Mar. 5, 2014, at B5 (noting that “about 2.7 percent of shareholders 
exercised appraisal rights [against Dell], including T. Rowe Price”). 
 149. See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 145. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. See, e.g., William B. Rubenstein, Why Enable Litigation? A Positive 
Externalities Theory of the Small Claims Class Action, 74 UMKC L. REV. 709, 723–24 
(2006) (describing this as the “decree effect”: “The legal principle developed in the case 
will create more certainty in structuring social behavior and lower the need for future 
adjudication concerning the decided issue. If future litigation does arise, the decree from the 
initial case will serve as stare decisis, hence making resolution of later cases more efficient. 
Beyond these general legal effects, the decree in the initial case could also be used to 
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opinions offers guidance to lawyers, businesses, and transaction planners of all 
types on how to structure their conduct or their clients’ conduct.153 The skill of the 
Delaware judiciary in interpreting and developing a body of corporate law has 
been cited as a key factor in the reason why half of U.S. public companies 
incorporate there, and why many states cite Delaware law as authoritative in 
construing their own corporate-law codes. Arbitration is private as are opinions 
issued by arbitrators, thereby eliminating the decree effect of litigation. And while 
it is true that most civil actions settle, undermining the decree effect of litigation, 
settled lawsuits still produce meaningful opinions on motions to dismiss or 
summary judgment motions, for example. Actually arbitrated cases would still 
have settlement effects, albeit ones that disproportionately favor large institutional 
investors with positive-value claims over smaller investors with negative-value 
claims, as discussed in Part V.154 And settlement effects obviously disappear to the 
extent that arbitration or plaintiff-pays provisions render previously economically 
viable actions unviable. Litigation also has “threat effects” to the extent that the 
mere threat of suit, and its attendant costs, affects actors.155 And finally litigation 
has institutional effects, in that it leads to the creation of a plaintiffs bar whose 
existence would be threatened by loss of the class action. I discuss this final point 
in detail in Part IV, where, I also discuss what would remain of shareholder 
litigation (or arbitration) if the class action disappeared. 
                                                                                                                
preclude re-litigation of factual issues in future cases among the same or similarly situated 
litigants. And most immediately, the decree may actually require a party to cease a practice 
affecting a group of individuals, even though the initial case was prosecuted by only one of 
them. An individual lawsuit that produces a judicial decision thereby has generated 
significant social benefits in terms of shaping conduct, reducing litigation costs, and 
preserving judicial resources.”). 
 153. See, e.g., id. at 723 (“[Litigation] establishes rules of conduct designed to 
shape future conduct, not only the present disputants' but also other people's.”). 
 154. See, e.g., Rubenstein, supra note 152, at 724 (defining “settlement effects”: 
“[I]f one litigant successfully challenges a policy that affects many persons, a defendant 
may agree to change its behavior as to the entire class. Even if a defendant does not agree as 
a formal matter to change its general policy as a consequence of the initial case, it may 
nonetheless do so informally lest it be faced with repeated lawsuits . . . The converse is true 
as well: shared information about a weak settlement may deter future litigants. Similarly, 
settlements by some defendants within an industry could encourage other 
defendant/competitors to settle. The information externalities of settlements are well known 
and account for much of the attempt to both publicize and keep confidential such 
information . . . .” (citing Blanca Fromm, Comment, Bringing Settlement out of the 
Shadows: Information About Settlement in an Age of Confidentiality, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 663 
(2001))). 
 155. Id. (“The risk of litigation is a cost that parties must factor into decision-
making in any sphere.” (citing GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970))). 
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B. How the Fiduciary Duty of Prudence Leads to a Duty to Investigate and 
Bring a Positive-Value Claim Under Trust Law and ERISA 
Under trust law generally, and under ERISA in particular, trustees owe 
beneficiaries the duties of loyalty and prudence.156 The duty of prudence requires 
that: 
[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a 
plan . . . with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the 
circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like 
capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of 
an enterprise of a like character and with like aims.157 
The duty of loyalty requires that “a fiduciary shall discharge his duties 
with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries.”158 
Courts have found that when “supervising pension assets, plan trustees have 
fiduciary obligations described as ‘the highest known to the law.’”159 Review of 
fiduciary decisions under ERISA has become more stringent in recent years. Up 
until 1989, ERISA fiduciaries’ actions were reviewed under the highly deferential 
“arbitrary or capricious” standard where there was no conflict of interest.160 In 
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch,161 the Supreme Court rejected this 
deferential standard, stating that it was not supported by the text of ERISA.162 “In 
evaluating fiduciaries’ administration of ERISA plans, courts have typically 
applied the stricter, statutory standard of care, limiting the applicability of the more 
lenient, arbitrary and capricious standard only to cases where the legality of the 
trustees’ benefit determination was at issue.”163 In the remainder of Part II, I 
outline how these duties, particularly the duty of care, have led courts to find that 
fund trustees have a duty to investigate and litigate positive-value claims on behalf 
of fund participants and beneficiaries. 
                                                                                                                
 156. George Gleason Bogert et al., The Law of Trusts and Trustees, in BOGERT’S 
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 543 (2014) (“Perhaps the most fundamental duty of a trustee is that 
he must display throughout the administration of the trust complete loyalty to the interests 
of the beneficiary and must exclude all selfish interest and all consideration of the interest of 
third persons.”). 
 157. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (2012). 
 158. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
 159. Flanigan v. Gen. Elec. Co., 242 F.3d 78, 86 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Donovan 
v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 272 n.8 (2d Cir. 1982)). 
 160. Moore v. Reynolds Metals Co. Ret. Program for Salaried Emps., 740 F.2d 
454, 457 (6th Cir. 1984) (“[A court’s review of trustees’ decisions] is limited to a 
determination of whether the trustees’ actions in administering or interpreting a plan’s 
provisions are arbitrary and capricious.”). 
 161. 489 U.S. 101 (1989). 
 162. Id. at 113–14 (“Adopting [a deferential arbitrary and capricious standard] 
would require us to impose a standard of review that would afford less protection to 
employees and their beneficiaries than they enjoyed before ERISA was enacted.”). 
 163. Ches v. Archer, 827 F. Supp. 159, 165 (W.D.N.Y. 1993). 
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1. The Duty to Investigate Potentially Positive-Value Claims 
For fund beneficiaries to succeed on a duty to investigate claim, showing 
the trustee’s inaction with respect to a potential claim is sufficient. For example, in 
Donovan v. Brians,164 a trustee failed to take any action to recover a delinquent 
loan. The court evaluated the trustee’s behavior according to a “reasonable efforts” 
standard in investigating the claim.165 In finding that the trustee failed to meet the 
“reasonable efforts” standard, the court shifted the burden to the defendant to show 
that the trust would not have recovered the loss to the trust even if it exerted 
“reasonable efforts.”166 Other courts have made similar findings. In Ches v. 
Archer,167 the court denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment because 
“[t]he officers’ apparent failure to investigate available options for recovering 
delinquent contributions to the plan . . . would, if proven, have shown a breach of 
fiduciary duties.”168 The court stated that failure to investigate the possibility of a 
lawsuit and/or other actions would represent a breach of fiduciary duty.169 
Similarly, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated that “trustees have 
a duty to investigate the relevant facts, to explore alternative courses of action and, 
if in the best interests of the plan participants, to bring suit against the 
employer.”170 Thus, the duty to investigate potentially positive-value claims is 
clearly established. Note that once plaintiffs establish this failure to investigate, the 
burden shifts to the defendant to show that the trustee would not have been 
successful in the suit.171 Barring such a showing, the trustee who fails to 
investigate will be found liable for breaching its duty of care.  
Trustees have successfully defended against failure to sue claims by: (1) 
establishing a paper trail documenting their deliberations over whether to bring the 
claim; (2) concluding that the claim would not be in the best interests of the trust 
for a variety of reasons—including that the lawsuit would disrupt the functioning 
of the trust, create bad publicity, or discourage qualified trustees from seeking the 
position; and (3) explaining that the decision not to bring suit was based in part on 
anticipated legal fees and the uncertainty of victory.172 In short, trustees are 
                                                                                                                
 164. 566 F. Supp. 1258 (E.D. Pa. 1983). 
 165. Id. at 1262. 
 166. Id. at 1265 (“Once failure to make reasonable efforts to recover the loan has 
been established, the burden of persuasion is on the defendants to show the loss to the plan 
would have occurred even if they had.”). 
 167. 827 F. Supp. 159. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 167. 
 170. McMahon v. McDowell,794 F.2d 100, 112 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 171. See Ches, 827 F. Supp. at 165. 
 172. See, e.g., Pillsbury v. Karmgard, 22 Cal. App. 4th 743 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); 
Axelrod v. Giambalvo, 472 N.E.2d 840, 843 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (ruling in favor of the 
defendants where defendants’ affidavits stated in part that the lawsuit would be a 
“disruption to the Trust’s orderly procedure,” be bad for publicity, and “the benefits which 
might be achieved for the Trust could not possibly compensate for the time and expense of 
litigation”). 
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justified in declining to sue if they have reason to believe that the claim is negative 
value. 
Under the duty to investigate, fiduciaries must institute procedures to 
detect potentially positive-value claims. The ostrich approach will not work: a 
trustee cannot avoid litigating a positive-value claim by blinding herself to its 
existence. Such procedures themselves incur costs, and while these should not be 
overstated, they would likely increase in a post-class-action world. Under the 
current legal regime, institutions should monitor their own portfolios for their 
exposure to class action claims.173 The duty actually requires fund fiduciaries to 
monitor their portfolios for potential claims, not simply to monitor their portfolios 
for existing class action claims that have already been filed. But there is little 
evidence suggesting that a fund would have a securities-fraud or transactional 
claim against a public company for which no class action has been filed.174 Today, 
custodial banks and class action monitoring services conduct most ongoing 
monitoring for fiduciaries. These institutions do not independently assess claims 
available to the portfolio and, instead, they track claims in existing class actions.175 
Nonlawyer portfolio monitors, or custodial banks that provide such services for 
institutional clients, monitor filed class actions (both domestically and, 
increasingly, internationally) and determine whether their clients are class 
members. If so, they also determine how much their clients ought to claim from 
the settlement.176 
Under the current legal regime, should the institution identify a claim, the 
decision to file a claim form in a settled class action is obvious.177 It requires a 
                                                                                                                
 173. Cox & Thomas, supra note 107, at 445 (“All institutions should seriously 
reevaluate their systems, and . . . most institutions should consider adopting more aggressive 
monitoring systems.”). 
 174. See generally Cain & Solomon, supra note 120. 
 175. Securities class action recovery firms such as Financial Recovery 
Technologies, Battea, and ISS’ Securities Class Action Services do not independently 
analyze securities for potential class actions. Instead, they maintain databases of both active 
and settled class actions against which they match an institutional investor’s trading history 
to identify potential claims. See, e.g., FIN. RECOVERY TECH., What We Do, 
http://frtservices.com/what-we-do/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2014); see also ISS SECURITIES 
CLASS ACTION SERVICES, http://www.issgovernance.com/governance-solutions/securities-
class-action-services/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2014); see also BATTEA, What We Do, 
http://www.battea.com/what-we-do/wwd-class-action-data-processing.html (last visited 
Mar. 13, 2014). This portfolio analysis then enables the firms to submit claims on behalf of 
the institutional investor in the existing active and settled class actions. Id. The situation is 
different for funds whose portfolios are monitored by plaintiffs’ lawyers, in which case the 
lawyers search portfolios for 10b-5 losses or exposure to transactional claims to find eligible 
lead plaintiff applicants. As I will argue below, one possible consequence of declining class 
actions would be increased portfolio monitoring of this type, seeking out positive-value 
claims, not lead-plaintiff applicants. 
 176. FIN. RECOVERY TECH., supra note 175. 
 177. See Cox & Thomas, supra note 107 at 424–25 (stating that there are 
substantial returns for submitting claims in settled securities class actions, providing 
significant returns at little cost). 
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relatively quick calculation to determine the size of the claim, followed by the cost 
of a postage stamp to mail in the claim form. The costs of attorneys’ fees are baked 
into the claim.178 Because the class action has been filed, the institution knows 
exactly where to look to identify the size of its exposure. It requires comparatively 
little independent legal or financial analysis.179 And, as noted earlier, there is little 
(but not zero) reason to fear judicial second-guessing of the decision to file a claim 
in the settled class action instead of opting out and bringing a separate action, 
though one might question whether this should be the case, given the prospects for 
greater recoveries in an opt-out action and the size of some of the losses for which 
institutions only file claim forms. Still, current practices largely insulate these 
decisions unless the firm would be settling other unique claims it has against the 
defendant by accepting its pro rata share of the settlement.180 
In the absence of a class action, the decision-making landscape shifts 
considerably. The first question becomes how an institution (or a third-party 
portfolio monitor) should search for potential claims in its portfolio (or how, given 
that it does not have filed class actions to tell it where to look). In fraud cases, the 
fund might examine large losses it incurred in a particular stock. Echoing the 
stock-drop cases of the pre- (and some would say post-) PSLRA era, substantial 
losses in any holding should automatically trigger an examination of whether the 
losses could have been caused by fraud.181 Smaller losses are less likely to yield 
positive-value claims. That said, large institutional investors with scores of outside 
managers might not automatically be aware that they have such losses. Press 
reports, governmental investigations, and information about litigations or 
arbitrations initiated by other funds should trigger the funds to examine their own 
portfolios for exposure to potentially meritorious claims. Even so, looking for 
stock drops alone is insufficient because plaintiffs can recover for gains they were 
deprived of by fraud.182 In the transactional context, funds should automatically 
examine their exposure to transactions over a particular dollar threshold, ones in 
which the fund held a substantial stake. For example, California State Teachers’ 
                                                                                                                
 178. See Russell Kamerman, Securities Class Action Abuse: Protecting Small 
Plaintiffs’ Big Money, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 853, 889 n.65 (2007) (“Generally, however, 
attorney fees in class actions are usually between 20–30% of the amount recovered, but it is 
not uncommon for the fee to reach 50%.”). 
 179. While it is theoretically the case that an institution could have a positive-
value claim in which no class action has been filed, failure to detect and bring such an 
action could be all the monitoring that is required under the current legal regime—including 
class actions—in the monitoring of filed class actions. 
 180. Harris v. Koenig, 602 F. Supp. 2d 39 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 181. See, e.g., Reed v. Prudential Sec. Inc., 875 F. Supp. 1285, 1289 (S.D. Tex. 
1995), aff’d, 87 F.3d 1311 (5th Cir. 1996) (“[C]ourts throughout the United States have held 
that a sharp drop in the price of stock triggers an investor’s duty to make diligent inquiry to 
discover the existence of possible fraud.”). 
 182. See In re Cigna Corp. Sec. Litig., 459 F. Supp. 2d 338, 349 (E.D. Pa. 2006) 
(“In a fraud on the market case, a plaintiff must show that, as a result of alleged 
misrepresentations and in reliance on an honest market, the plaintiff purchased shares 
which, when the alleged fraud was revealed, were worth less than the plaintiff had paid for 
those same shares.”) (citing Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241–42 (1988)). 
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Retirement System maintains a policy of seeking lead-plaintiff appointments in 
cases in which its stake is greater than $5 million, although it is the second-largest 
fund in the country and would therefore be expected to maintain a high absolute 
threshold for litigation.183 Similarly, press reports or other publicly available 
information about actions brought by other institutional plaintiffs in the 
transactional context—including arbitrations or appraisal claims—should trigger 
an examination of the fund’s position in the target’s stock. It may well be the case 
that, without a class action, institutional investors will have to deploy claims-
monitoring systems to monitor their portfolios, similar to the practice used by 
plaintiffs’ lawyers that are seeking out claims. In that case, lawyers themselves 
may need to be involved in the monitoring. 
2. The Duty to Bring a Positive-Value Claim 
Generally, under trust law, a trustee’s failure to pursue a “valuable” legal 
claim is a breach of fiduciary duty.184 The Restatement (Third) of Trusts states: “A 
beneficiary may maintain a proceeding related to the trust or its property against a 
third party only if . . . the trustee is unable, unavailable, unsuitable, or improperly 
failing to protect the beneficiary’s interest.”185 The beneficiaries have standing to 
sue fund trustees and the third party that committed the tort.186 Case law supports 
the assertions made in the Restatement and treatises.187 For example, the Court of 
Appeals of Utah held that beneficiaries may “bring an action against a third party 
when the beneficiary’s interests are hostile to those of the trustee,” and noted that 
many other jurisdictions also allow for beneficiary standing—consistent with the 
Restatements.188 Likewise, ERISA fiduciaries generally have a fiduciary duty to 
pursue valuable claims of the plan.189 
                                                                                                                
 183. Webber, Pay-to-Play supra note 114, at 2040. 
 184. Tittle v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig.), 
284 F. Supp. 2d 511, 555 n.60 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (“In Harris Trust . . . the Supreme Court 
turned to the Restatement (Second) of Trusts as its source for the common law of trusts.”). 
 185. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 107 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 186. N.J. Carpenters Health Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 2d 324, 338 
(D.N.J. 1998) (stating that fiduciaries of trust funds are obliged to sue perpetrators of fraud 
directed at the fund). 
 187. See, e.g., Wolf v. Mitchell, Silberberg & Knupp, 76 Cal. App. 4th 1030, 
1037 (1999) (“California has adopted the rule of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, 
section 282, subdivision (2), which states that ‘[i]f the trustee improperly refuses or neglects 
to bring an action against the third person, the beneficiary can maintain a suit in equity 
against the trustee and the third person.’”) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 282 
(1959)). 
 188. Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 841 P.2d 742, 745 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992) (citing Alioto v. United States, 593 F.Supp. 1402, 1412 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Booth v. 
Sec. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 155 F.Supp. 755, 761 (D.N.J. 1957); Hoyle v. Dickinson, 155 Ariz. 
277, 279, 746 P.2d 18, 20 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987); Apollinari v. Johnson, 104 Mich. Ct. App. 
673, 305 N.W.2d 565, 567 (1981)). 
 189. See Donovan v. Bryans, 566 F. Supp. 1258, 1262 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (holding 
that among the general “prudent man” standards, the fiduciary has a “duty to take 
reasonable steps to realize on claims held in trust”); Freund v. Marshall & Ilsley Bank, 485 
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Note that treatises and case law reference the idea of a “valuable” claim, 
or a claim in the “best interests” of plan participants.190 Although these sources do 
not specifically define what constitutes a “valuable” or “best interests” claim, it is 
implicit that these terms reference positive-value claims. Positive-value claims are 
claims whose expected value is positive once accounting for the probability of 
winning, the anticipated award, and litigation or arbitration costs.191 It would be 
irrational for treatises and case law to support the bringing of claims that, for 
example, were strong on the merits, but which involved paltry damages and high 
litigation costs that ultimately outweighed the suit’s reward. Such claims could be 
meritorious, but they are neither “valuable” nor in the “best interests” of plan 
participants and beneficiaries because they would leave the latter worse off than if 
the claim had never been brought. Thus, for example, Comment C to § 177 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts states that a trustee will not be liable for failing to 
bring a cause of action “if it is reasonable not to bring such an action, owing to the 
probable expense involved in the action or to the probability that the action would 
be unsuccessful or that if successful the claim would be uncollectible owing to the 
insolvency of the defendant or otherwise.”192 Whether such a calculation is 
“reasonable” will undoubtedly be shaped by the trustees’ degree of risk aversion. 
Furthermore, as noted above, other considerations like legal fees, publicity 
concerns, and concerns about whether the litigation would disrupt the core 
operations of the fund, may all be taken into account in weighing the value of the 
claim.193 
So far, courts have been reluctant to find that trustees have breached the 
duty of care by failing to bring a positive-value claim. The legal risk to fiduciaries 
for failing to investigate appears to be higher than the risk of failing to litigate, so 
long as it is clear that the decision not to litigate resulted from a deliberative 
process. However, the litigation posture of almost all of the “failure to sue” cases 
is one in which courts would be less likely to find a breach of duty than in the 
                                                                                                                
F. Supp. 629, 641 (W.D. Wis. 1979) (finding that by failing to take any action to recover on 
outstanding notes, the trustee breached his fiduciary duty); Harris v. Koenig, 602 F. Supp. 
2d 39, 55 (D.D.C. 2009) (“When, as in this case, a plan has potential claims against a third 
party, the ‘trustees have a duty to investigate the relevant facts, to explore alternative 
courses of action, and, if in the best interests of the plan participants, to bring suit . . . .’” 
(quoting McMahon v. McDowell, 794 F.2d 100, 112 (3d Cir. 1986))). 
 190. See Harris, 602 F. Supp 2d at 55. 
 191. “For example, a victim of wrongful conduct will have an incentive to file an 
individual suit when the expected recovery exceeds the cost of the litigation.” Linda 
Sandstrom Simard, A View From Within the Fortune 500: An Empirical Study of Negative 
Value Class Actions and Deterrence, 47 IND. L. REV. 739, 742 (2014) (explaining what a 
positive-value claim is). 
 192. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 177 cmt. C (“When trustee need not 
bring an action. It is not the duty of the trustee to bring an action to enforce a claim which is 
a part of the trust property if it is reasonable not to bring such an action, owing to the 
probable expense involved in the action or to the probability that the action would be 
unsuccessful or that if successful the claim would be uncollectible owing to the insolvency 
of the defendant or otherwise.”). 
 193. See discussion supra p. 230. 
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shareholder-litigation context. Almost all of the relevant cases contained claims 
brought against trustees who failed to sue an employer or plan sponsor that did not 
make required contributions to the pension fund.194 These cases implicate the duty 
of loyalty in addition to the duty of care because ERISA trustees often serve as 
sponsor managers too.195 Courts have been reluctant to find liability against 
trustees in this context because the defendant trustees had other means available to 
enforce their beneficiaries’ rights.196 In addition to suing the delinquent employer, 
trustees may randomly audit the employer’s records, threaten work stoppages, 
picket the employer, or engage in other actions depending upon the 
circumstances.197 When trustees have several options to remedy the beneficiaries’ 
harm, courts do not find a broad-based duty to litigate.198 
The shareholder-litigation context is different in several key ways. First, 
unlike the cases just described, it is less likely that a claim for breach of the duty of 
loyalty would play a prominent role in shareholder litigation. A pension trustee 
who also serves as a company manager faces a clear loyalty conflict, and a 
decision to favor the company over the trust by failing to bring a positive-value 
claim for the trust against the company, leaves a trustee exposed to a claim that she 
failed to make that decision “solely in the interest[s] of participants and 
beneficiaries and [for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits].”199 The same 
decision by a trustee in the context of a tort committed by a third party, like a 
securities fraud, is less fraught with loyalty concerns. Although claims like these 
always turn on the particular facts of the case, a trustee’s loyalties are less likely to 
be questioned in the context of a fraud committed, or poor deal terms offered, by 
third parties other than the plan sponsor. 
The analysis for breach of the duty of care comes out differently. As 
noted above, plan participants and beneficiaries have forms of recourse other than 
litigation against a recalcitrant plan sponsor. Consequently, courts have been 
reluctant to find trustees liable for breach of the duty of care for failing to bring a 
positive-value claim.200 Yet in the shareholder-litigation context, participants and 
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beneficiaries have no form of recourse against a third-party fraudster or against 
boards that breach the standard set forth in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes 
Holdings, Inc.201 of failing to maximize share price in a merger. Litigation is their 
only option, and plaintiff beneficiaries will have a comparatively easy time 
distinguishing the prior cases that have tilted against finding a breach in this 
context. 
Thus, the answer to whether funds will bring an independent shareholder 
action when there is no class option will depend, in large part, upon the trustees’ 
assessment of whether the potential claim is positive. This leads to an empirical 
question as to how many funds would be likely to have positive-value claims, and 
what types of funds might be inclined to bring them. Litigating shareholder 
lawsuits is expensive and time consuming. Potential plaintiffs’ exposure to any one 
fraud or any one transaction may be relatively small, and these suits tend to be of 
negative value when accounting for legal fees and costs—though recovery of such 
fees and costs is available to plaintiffs, and might remain so in a post-class-action 
environment.202 For example, among public-pension funds, the top 50 or so with 
assets in excess of $10 billion would be most likely to have positive-value 
claims.203 These funds would be likely to incur either substantial losses in 
securities frauds, or have significant exposures to transactions, that might make a 
claim worthwhile. 
As stated earlier, what shareholder litigation (or arbitration) would look 
like without class actions depends on two critical questions: how many funds will 
have positive-value claims, and how sizable are those claims likely to be? These 
questions are worthy of comprehensive empirical study in a separate empirical 
project. To attain an informal sense of whether it is plausible to believe that any 
funds would have positive-value claims, I spoke with the heads of two portfolio-
monitoring companies that monitor their clients’ claims in existing class actions. 
On October 20, 2014, I interviewed Michael Egan, the president and founder of 
Class Action Claims Management, based in Charlotte, North Carolina.204 He told 
me that one of his clients had a $350 million loss in the Schering-Plough/Merck 
shareholder class action. He described the process the company went through in 
deciding whether to opt out of the class action, and the ultimate decision not to 
remain in the class. According to Egan, the client’s legal department wanted to opt 
out, but the portfolio managers were more reluctant to do so—in part because the 
losses reflected performance from years before, and also because the company had 
no systems in place for making this decision. In the end, the company decided to 
just file a claim form in the class action. But according to Egan, having gone 
through the opt-out process once, the company has now developed a system for 
making such a decision the next time, and it has identified the people who need to 
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be part of the decision-making process. Egan thinks the company has “warmed up” 
to the idea of opting out, and that it will do so next time. The company has 
established a $50 million threshold for doing so. 
Egan also told me that clients with assets ranging $10–$50 billion should 
have sufficient claims to opt out—or, for purposes of this paper, to bring an 
arbitration—if the class action route was no longer available. Such clients, he 
stated, “could easily have claims in the $10–$20 million range,” not only because 
of their size, but because they tend to have more concentrated investments than 
funds in the range of $100 billion or more in assets. Egan told me that he had 
multiple clients with losses in the range of $30–$50 million in securities class 
actions against Hewlett Packard, JP Morgan, and the Citigroup Bonds class 
action.205 
I also spoke with the CEO of another claims-monitoring firm, who wishes 
to remain anonymous. He emailed me the following on March 30, 2014: 
As promised, I could give you some quick anecdotal info regarding 
client losses in potential actions . . . [I]n the last six months we’ve 
looked at at least 3 cases where we thought clients with large losses 
might consider opting out, and so I can tell you that, for instance, in 
[the] Massey Energy [class action] we had 5 client[s] with losses 
between $8 m[illion] and $16 m[illion] each. In [the] Facebook 
[class action] we had one client with close to $20 m[illion] in losses. 
And in [the] Best Buy [class action] we had more than 10 clients 
with losses between $1 and $10 m[illion]. 
I know we’ve had instances where the losses were more substantial 
than this, but I can’t recall the exact numbers . . . . But this gives 
you a sense that at least among [our] clients . . . the losses often 
exceed $5 m[illion] if not a multiple of that.206 
While the above statements do not resolve the empirical questions I pose, 
they do suggest that the number of institutional investors with positive-value 
claims could be substantial enough to maintain the viability of at least some 
shareholder litigation outside the class action context. In assessing the economic 
viability of such actions, firms must inquire into the total damages claimed and the 
litigation costs. 
It is clear that, because small claims become economically unviable 
outside the class context, the total damages claimed would be reduced in a post-
class-action world. Moreover, because the threat of fiduciary liability for close 
calls is low, and the hassle of litigation too great, many marginally positive-value 
claims might similarly vanish. It is tempting to think that reduced damage claims 
will necessarily lead to reduced damages, but some caution is merited here. 
Currently, total recoveries in securities class actions hover in the pitiful range of 
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7% of damages claimed.207 Yet there have been several class actions from which 
institutional investors have opted out and recovered a far higher percentage of their 
damages.208 Several institutions claim to have recovered 100% of their losses from 
opting out, and others have claimed recovering far higher damages from opting out 
than they would have had they remained in the class action.209 There are several 
reasons why opting out might have resulted in higher recoveries. For instance, 
companies might be more willing to pay higher damages to large institutional 
investors, like pension funds, that will maintain a substantial stake in the 
company.210 It may be that institutional investors are more deeply engaged in 
monitoring their counsel and prosecuting the case when they are pursuing a 
separate opt-out action, than when they are passive class members or even lead 
plaintiffs—though many of the successful opt outs occurred in cases in which 
dozens of institutions opted out together, resulting in a quasi-class action. 211 
A second issue is litigation costs. As discussed above, for cases to be 
positive value, the expected value of the suit must be positive net of legal fees and 
costs.212 Currently, litigation costs are quite substantial for both plaintiffs and 
defendants. Dealing with the analysis under arbitration provisions first, most 
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commentators expect that arbitration reduces these costs.213 The fact that 
arbitration would limit recovery for negative-value claims is frequently cited as a 
virtue of arbitration because it would eliminate what critics view as frivolous 
litigation against companies—litigation that harms shareholders big and small.214 
Also, arbitration claims tend to be resolved more rapidly than litigation, benefitting 
plaintiffs who recover earlier and may also pay lower attorneys’ fees on account of 
lower costs.215 Greater engagement by shareholders overseeing attorneys in an 
individual arbitration may lead to higher recoveries as a percentage of damages 
claimed.216 The opportunity to select arbitrators allows parties to choose decision-
makers with relevant legal or judicial experience, rather than expose themselves to 
the judicial lottery.217 
Still, some commentators have challenged the view that arbitration 
reduces litigation costs.218 For defendants, there are several reasons to believe that 
such costs may rise in arbitration. First, defendants have no “off ramps” in 
arbitration, no motion to dismiss, no motion for class certification, and no motion 
for summary judgment. There is no obvious, early opportunity to get rid of 
arbitration. Arbitrators are paid hourly, often at high rates, they have no incentive 
to end early, and there are usually three of them.219 In contrast, judges with full 
dockets have the opportunity, and perhaps the inclination, to grant motions to 
dismiss, to deny class certification, or to grant summary judgment motions. Judges 
are compensated by taxpayers, rather than by arbitrating parties.  
Second, plaintiffs in 10b-5 securities-fraud class actions face a bar on 
discovery. While it is true that discovery is generally not available in arbitration, 
arbitrators may choose to order it, thus giving plaintiffs discovery that would not 
have been available to them in a class action.220 Third, expensive as it may be to 
defend a securities class action, at least that action typically resolves all the claims 
at once. In the kind of bilateral arbitration that bars consolidation that corporations 
would most likely choose, each party arbitrates separately. Thus, defendant 
companies might face dozens of separate arbitrations against large institutional 
investors, in dozens of forums stretching out over extended periods of time. Of 
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course, if overall recovered damages drop in the presence of arbitration clauses, 
then the tradeoff would be worth it, even if arbitration actually increased litigation 
costs. But even if both litigation costs and overall costs were to defy expectations 
and increase in arbitration, companies might still not drop mandatory-arbitration 
provisions because managers might prefer that allegations against them be aired in 
confidential arbitration proceedings rather than in open court. 
In the deal context, mandatory arbitration would make it impossible for 
plaintiffs to enjoin a shareholder meeting, which is the source of much of 
plaintiffs’ settlement leverage. This could then shift the focus of institutional 
investors to appraisal proceedings. Lately, such proceedings have attracted 
increased attention from investors and the loss of a meaningful remedy under 
Revlon might force more institutions to seek out appraisal remedies, particularly in 
cases where institutional lead plaintiffs have had success in litigating transactional 
class actions in the past.221 
Plaintiff-pays provisions change the analysis somewhat. The cost of 
litigating a claim in court now bears the increased risk of having to assume the 
defendants’ costs too.222 On the other hand, a standalone plaintiff-pays provision 
would still enable consolidation of claims, and sharing of litigation costs, unless it 
were twinned with an arbitration provision. These provisions increase claims costs 
even further, and render fewer claims of positive value at the margins, allowing 
only the strongest claims to proceed. As noted earlier, while they might reduce the 
number of suits, they would also incentivize plaintiffs to vigorously litigate the 
cases they do bring to the end. 
One would expect that the types of funds that would be most likely to 
avoid this litigation would be similar to the ones that avoid lead-plaintiff 
appointments now, and for similar reasons. For example, mutual funds avoid 
obtaining lead-plaintiff appointments in securities and transactional class actions, 
as noted above.223 A mutual fund might have a strong claim for securities fraud 
against a Fortune-100 company that utilizes the mutual fund’s platform of 401(k) 
offerings for its employees’ retirement savings. Mutual funds would rationally 
consider the detrimental impact of a lawsuit or arbitration against the company on 
its future business with that company. So might intrafund conflicts in which 
different funds might have different stakes in the defendant, or in the deal context, 
different stakes in the target and the acquirer.224 Such considerations could 
transform what might otherwise have been a positive-value claim into a negative-
value one, just as they might incline such funds to shun lead-plaintiff 
appointments.  
But there are meaningful distinctions between obtaining a lead-plaintiff 
appointment or opting out of a class action and declining to pursue a claim when 
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no other recourse exists. In arbitration, the free-rider problem is neutralized. Only 
the arbitrating plaintiff benefits from a settlement or verdict, not a class that 
includes the plaintiff’s competitors—who, if they so choose, can arbitrate on their 
own behalf.225 Also, arbitration proceedings are confidential, and decisions have 
no precedential value, reducing the free-rider problem to something close to 
zero.226 Furthermore, while mutual funds would be right to consider their ongoing 
business relationship with a potential defendant, and intrafund-family conflicts, it 
must occasionally be true that the size of the loss due to fraud must outweigh these 
competing considerations and compel a lawsuit. Nor should the costs of suing a 
client be overstated. A defendant corporation that removes a mutual fund from its 
employees’ 401(k) platform in retaliation for the mutual fund’s credible fraud 
claim might face questions about whether the company’s actions are consistent 
with its duties of loyalty and prudence it owes to plan participants and 
beneficiaries. Similar arguments could be made for banks, insurance companies, 
and other institutional investors that currently remain passive in securities and 
transactional class actions. These entities have business relationships with 
corporate defendants that they will want to safeguard, and which would rightly 
count against bringing claims. But the scope of these limitations should not be 
overstated, particularly in the face of a substantial fraud. 
Still, to the extent that shareholder litigation continues without class 
actions, it is likely that its leading participants will remain public-pension funds 
and labor-union funds, the same funds that serve as the most frequent lead 
plaintiffs today. According to my own research, 127 public-pension funds served 
as lead plaintiffs in securities class actions between 2003 and 2006,227 while 32 
public-pension funds and 28 labor-union funds served as lead plaintiffs in 
Delaware deal cases between 2003 and 2009.228 There have also been a few 
instances of cases in which there were a substantial number of opt-outs by 
institutional investors that received wide coverage—for example, the In re 
Worldcom & Qwest Communications litigation.229 Public-pension funds have a 
total of $3 trillion under management.230 As noted earlier, more than 50 public-
pension funds manage in excess of $10 billion, making them plausible candidates 
to be repeat players with positive-value claims.231 Because they lack many of the 
conflicts that other investors do, we might still expect to see them as active players 
in shareholder litigation, even without class actions. Labor-union funds have been 
similarly active, though they are far smaller on average, and are less likely to have 
positive-value claims. Accordingly, they may be less significant players in a post-
class-action world than they are now. 
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III. MAPPING THE INSURANCE LANDSCAPE FOR PUBLIC-PENSION-
FUND FIDUCIARIES 
In this Part, I discuss the somewhat unusual insurance landscape for 
fiduciaries of public-pension funds. I raise this point because these funds have 
historically been the most active lead-plaintiff participants in transactional class 
actions in Delaware, the second most active participants in securities-fraud class 
actions, and by far the largest and most successful class representatives, correlating 
with better outcomes for shareholders.232 To the extent that any institutions will 
remain active in a world of shareholder arbitration instead of litigation, public-
pension funds are among the most likely candidates. And because of the arguments 
outlined above, demonstrating how such fiduciaries could be held liable for failing 
to adequately monitor fund portfolios, or failing to litigate positive-value claims, 
the insurance landscape in which they will make litigation decisions is relevant. 
This landscape also differs greatly from the world of directors’ and officers’ 
liability insurance with which most corporate-law academics and practitioners are 
familiar. 
I recently discussed fiduciary liability insurance for public-pension 
trustees with Daniel Aronowitz, managing principal of Euclid Specialty Managers, 
LLC—leading provider of such insurance.233 I also discussed this topic with an 
executive at one of the leading insurance companies who requested anonymity 
(“the Executive”). According to Aronowitz’s estimation, at least half of all U.S. 
public-pension plans do not have fiduciary insurance for their board members; he 
estimates the actual number of uninsured public-pension plans at more than 
60%.234 The Executive concurred with this figure. To the extent it is accurate, this 
astonishing percentage of uninsured pension fiduciaries is likely the product of 
several factors, according to both Aronowitz and the Executive. First, many of the 
largest insurers avoid providing fiduciary insurance for underfunded (less than 
80% funded) pension funds for fear that the trustees will be held liable for such 
underfunding—as has already occurred in cases like L.I. Head Start Child 
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Development Services, Inc. v. Economic Opportunity Commission of Nassau 
County, Inc.235 Similarly, many of the large insurers are wary of writing policies 
for these funds because of the liability concerns associated with widespread 
changes to benefits in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis.236 For example, 
the Illinois Teachers Retirement System, which was significantly underfunded 
until recently, solicited bids for fiduciary liability insurance coverage from more 
than 20 insurance companies.237 In response, only two bothered to offer a quote, 
and neither of these were major insurance companies.238 
While obtaining insurance may be difficult for some funds, many funds 
also decline to obtain insurance because their state, county, and municipal 
sponsors can assert sovereign immunity for public-pension trustees acting within 
the scope of their duties.239 Other states waive sovereign immunity and allow 
indemnification for fiduciary violations as long as the conduct was not willful or 
grossly negligent.240 Unfortunately, neither option offers particularly robust 
protection to pension trustees. 
First, whether the state or municipality will assert sovereign immunity in 
response to any particular lawsuit is not a decision that is made by the pension 
board, but usually by the state attorney general or the city attorney.241 This 
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introduces uncertainty and political considerations into the assertion of sovereign 
immunity.242 In the most prominent example of this uncertainty, five trustees of the 
San Diego County Employees Retirement System were sued in 2005 for breaches 
of their fiduciary duties in connection with the city’s inability to fund pensions.243 
The defendants were charged with allowing the city to limit funding of the 
retirement system while increasing pension payments to city employees, which 
included the defendants.244 The City Council and then the City Attorney both 
declined to provide a defense for the fiduciaries, who ultimately sued the city to 
seek indemnification of their costs.245 Similarly, in Estes v. Anderson,246 plaintiffs 
sued the pension-fund trustees of the Detroit General Retirement System, the 
Detroit Police and Fire Retirement System, and the systems’ investment advisors, 
for gross negligence and breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with investments 
by the fund. The defendants pleaded sovereign immunity as a defense.247 Although 
the Court of Appeals of Michigan affirmed dismissal of most of the plaintiffs’ 
claims on these grounds, the gross negligence claim survived because immunity 
does not extend to gross negligence.248 Thus, Estes illustrates a clear way to plead 
around an immunity defense.  
Similar logic applies to indemnification clauses. Typically, these 
indemnification clauses are limited by public policy concerns.249 Statutes 
governing public-pension funds often preclude indemnification for a wider range 
of actions than prohibited in the general trust context, but still allow it in certain 
circumstances. In California, public-pension plans are prohibited by statute from 
obtaining insurance that will immunize the fiduciary from liability stemming from 
its breaches.250 Delaware allows indemnification, but limits it to “[good-faith] 
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conduct reasonably believed in the ‘best interest’ of the state.”251 Nearly half the 
states explicitly authorize indemnification insurance.252 ERISA does not govern 
public-pension funds, but it may be cited as persuasive authority in interpreting 
state pension codes.253 
ERISA demands that trustees be held personally liable for breaches of 
fiduciary duty to the plan: 
Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches 
any of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon 
fiduciaries by this subchapter shall be personally liable to make 
good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such 
breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary 
which have been made through use of assets of the plan by the 
fiduciary, and shall be subject to such other equitable or remedial 
relief as the court may deem appropriate, including removal of such 
fiduciary.254 
ERISA prohibits all exculpatory and indemnity provisions that relieve 
fiduciaries from their duty or liability as against public policy.255 ERISA, however, 
does allow for insuring against breaches of fiduciary duties, conditional upon the 
insurance still allowing for ultimate recourse against the fiduciary.256 If this 
insurance is purchased by the plan (as opposed to by the employer or the fiduciary 
himself), the insurance company must ultimately have recourse against the 
fiduciary.257 It is true that the plan may utilize plan assets to purchase insurance for 
its trustees, but plan assets may not be used to directly settle liability judgments 
against trustees. As mentioned above, public-pension funds are not bound by 
ERISA and have taken varied approaches to curtailing and/or indemnifying 
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fiduciary liability. Some invoke sovereign immunity as noted above;258 while other 
plans have specific exculpation clauses, indemnification provisions, or both.259 
Thus, plan sponsors could purchase insurance for their trustees, but may 
prefer not to assume a cost they view as unnecessary in light of their ability to 
shield their trustees from liability by invoking sovereign immunity for all but the 
most egregious behavior. As the Executive told me, “[T]hey are reluctant to be 
questioned later about expenses that may be mistakenly viewed as unnecessary.” 
Thus, pension trustees face a quandary. In the absence of fiduciary liability 
insurance, they are only protected if the plan sponsor chooses to protect them. The 
lack of predictable insurance coverage may have unpredictable effects on trustee 
behavior. A few developments suggest that the dearth and uncertainty of coverage 
could prompt trustees, at the margins, to favor litigating over not litigating fraud 
and deal cases. First, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, many public-pension 
funds have faced unprecedented criticism and scrutiny over underfunding issues.260 
Although pension-fund balance sheets have improved in recent years, many 
remain underfunded, and even those that are no longer underfunded operate in a 
political environment in which elected officials and voters are newly sensitized to 
the dangers of such underfunding.261 In this environment, doing nothing in the face 
of fraud becomes politically risky. Without insurance, the risk of suit for failing to 
sue, and certainly for failing to monitor, might incline trustees with nonfrivolous 
claims to proceed with such claims. Another development that might affect trustee 
decision-making is the recent sharp increase in ERISA litigation, particularly 
breach of fiduciary duty lawsuits brought on behalf of fund beneficiaries.262 Large 
damages payouts likely lead firms to devote more resources to bringing these 
cases, and enable them to develop the war chests required to finance them.263 They 
may seek out similar problems in the public-pension space. Increased stress placed 
on retirement funds by the retirement of the Baby Boomers may be a further spur 
to such litigation. 
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The dearth and uncertainty of insurance coverage may also result in an 
unusually high degree of herding behavior over litigation/arbitration.264 Because of 
the threat of personal liability for getting this decision wrong, trustees might best 
protect themselves by doing whatever their peer institutions do. It might be 
unusual to see cases in which just a few pension funds file suit; rather, we might 
see zero arbitrations or a large number of institutional investors bringing 
arbitrations. 
Of course, a pension trustee could breach her fiduciary duties by filing a 
frivolous suit just as much as by failing to file a meritorious one.265 Undoubtedly, 
trustees should be reasonable in documenting why they opted to sue or not. But the 
probability that they will be found liable for filing a frivolous suit is extremely low 
unless the court states on the record that the suit is frivolous, or there is some type 
of sanction. Presumably, the lawyers bringing the suit will also be constrained by 
the threat of Rule 11 sanctions.266 It might come down to little more than a 
question of who is more likely to sue you: a beneficiary who thinks you failed to 
act in the face of fraud, or one who is upset that you tried and failed to recover in 
the face of fraud. In the face of uncertainty, trustees may find action more 
defensible than inaction. 
As discussed more fully below in Part IV, a second development that 
could affect trustees is how that bar would respond to loss of the class action 
device. These firms are armed with substantial resources they will deploy to 
maintain their practices. They will need a broad pool of institutional clients—not 
just the largest ones that can win lead-plaintiff appointments, but also those that 
are large enough to have positive-value claims. Given the potential for bankruptcy 
faced by plaintiff firms without class actions, it is not too farfetched to imagine 
that they themselves would target a fund’s trustees for failure to bring suit over a 
positive-value fraud claim, perhaps a fund controlled by elected officials who 
would be strongly disinclined to become a client of such firms. One can also 
imagine good-cop/bad-cop dynamics taking hold. A small firm affiliated with 
plaintiff law firms brings an action against trustees for failure to sue, thereby not 
soiling the plaintiff firms’ reputation with pension funds, while creating incentives 
for funds to monitor and perhaps bring arbitrations of their own. 
The insurance environment leaves public-pension trustees unusually 
vulnerable to litigation. This is not to suggest that such vulnerability is a bad thing. 
It may make such trustees more sensitive to their fiduciary duties than comparable 
agents at other funds that are more insulated. The class action has rendered these 
trustees largely impervious to claims against them for their portfolio-monitoring 
and litigating conduct, perhaps helping to conceal an unusual, and potentially 
unstable, insurance situation. Loss of the class action could prompt reform of how 
such pension trustees are insured but, in the meantime, it should lead to careful 
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portfolio monitoring, prosecution of positive-value claims, and herding behavior 
by funds seeking to justify their fiduciary choices through reference to the actions 
of other trustees. 
IV. HOW LOSS OF THE CLASS ACTION WOULD AFFECT THE 
PLAINTIFFS’ BAR 
There is a broad array of potential outcomes for the plaintiffs’ bar should 
the class action be eliminated, ranging from dissolution to thriving practices 
representing institutional investors in shareholder arbitration, to new competition 
from traditional law firms. Below, I will sketch out some of the ways that loss of 
the class action could impact the plaintiffs’ bar. Before doing so, I note some 
recent empirical research on plaintiffs’ law firms that accounts for their quality. In 
Zealous Advocates or Self-Interested Actors: Assessing the Value of Plaintiffs’ 
Law Firms in Merger Litigation, C.N.V. Krishnan, Steven Davidoff Solomon, and 
Randall Thomas evaluate 1,739 merger class actions in five states between 2003 
and 2012.267 They find that, after controlling for selection bias, top plaintiffs’ law 
firms correlate with a higher probability of lawsuit success.268 They also suggest 
that this success stems from more active case prosecution by such firms, more 
documents filed, and more motions for an injunction.269 Similarly, in Law Firm 
Quality, Deal Litigation, and Firm Value, Adam Badawi and I study all merger 
class actions in Delaware from 2003 to 2008.270 In our event study, we find a 
positive market reaction to deal lawsuits filed by top law firms, and a negative 
reaction to suits filed by poor quality firms.271 We find this effect both for 
conflicted transactions like management buy-outs and controlling shareholder 
transactions.272 As for 10b-5 securities class actions, several studies have found 
that institutional investors generally, and public-pension lead plaintiffs in 
particular, correlate with better outcomes for shareholders.273 Other studies have 
found these results for merger class actions too.274 In combination, these studies 
suggest that at least a subset of this litigation performs as designed and enhances 
shareholder value (or at least target shareholder value in deal cases). They also 
point to one of the deep flaws of mandatory-arbitration or fee-shifting 
provisions—they are blunt instruments that threaten meritorious and frivolous suits 
alike, high and low quality firms alike. 
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A. The Economic Status Quo for Shareholder and Transactional Litigators 
Assessing how loss of the class action would affect the plaintiffs’ bar 
requires assessment of why we have a separate plaintiffs’ bar in the first place. 
Many practice areas dominated by class actions subdivide into plaintiffs’ and 
defense firms, including mass-tort, consumer, antitrust, employment, and 
securities/transactional.275 Law-firm economics, path-dependent historical 
circumstances, conflicts of interest, and the politics of class actions all explain 
these plaintiff/defense schisms. First, class action dynamics, including aggregation 
of negative-value claims, tilt in favor of plaintiff-lawyer compensation by 
contingency fee because the clients will not rationally pay their legal fees out of 
pocket.276 Law firms that are compensated by contingency fees organize 
themselves differently than firms compensated under the billable-hour model. 
Contingency-fee arrangements require considerable risk taking and reward.277 In 
the securities space, it may involve incurring five years (on average) of litigation 
expenses with the possibility of zero compensation, or a large payoff that can be 
several times the hourly wage of even the most highly compensated partners at 
defense firms.278 Plaintiffs’ lawyers select and maintain a portfolio of cases in 
various stages of development. Risk taking, managing a portfolio of cases, and 
assuming the costs of litigation directly distinguish the economics of plaintiffs’ 
firms from defense firms. Defense firms mostly operate on the billable-hour 
model. They are compensated monthly for legal expenses incurred, and they rarely 
assume either the risk or the rewards of the cases they litigate—being compensated 
on effort rather than outcomes. While some firms have taken to blending these two 
compensation models, for the most part, firms tend to adopt one or the other. A 
firm’s choice of a compensation model may be “sticky” in that it may create 
incentives within the firm to avoid work that operates on a different billing model. 
Beyond compensation dynamics, there are marketing and social-network 
reasons why traditional law firms have shunned plaintiff-side class action practice. 
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These firms sell their services to large, multinational corporations, offering a full 
suite of legal services.279 Transactional services include IPOs, M&A, and corporate 
restructurings; litigation services include intercompany lawsuits, defense of 
criminal and civil governmental investigations, and other regulatory actions; both 
practice areas require related legal service like tax, bankruptcy, trusts and estates, 
employment, etc.280 These firms operate globally to meet the demands of their 
clients—sometimes with offices in dozens of cities on multiple continents. Suing 
these same clients in class actions would fit poorly into this marketing scheme. It 
potentially undermines a firm’s pitch to corporate managers when the firm itself 
regularly sues such managers on behalf of investors.281 Perhaps more importantly, 
representation of a class against one large multinational corporation could create 
conflicts of interest that might prevent the firm from offering any of its remaining 
services to that corporation, assuming the defendant were still interested in hiring a 
firm that had sued it. 
These are some of the reasons why legal representation of plaintiffs in 
class actions has remained distinct from traditional law practice. And, while still 
true for securities and transactional litigation, the plaintiff side of the business has 
recently begun to more closely resemble the traditional litigation model. 
Historically, securities class actions were litigated with individual investor lead 
plaintiffs, prompting famed plaintiffs’ lawyer and convicted felon, Bill Lerach, to 
quip: “I have the greatest practice in the world. I have no clients.”282 Lawyers 
brought cases and handpicked their clients.283 Only with passage of the PSLRA did 
institutional investors assume a commanding role in these actions.284 A specific 
goal of these reforms was to make plaintiff-side representation more closely 
resemble traditional legal representation. In this respect, the lead-plaintiff and lead-
counsel reforms of the PSLRA succeeded by empowering institutional clients to 
select counsel, negotiate legal fees, and monitor law firm performance.285 These 
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reforms only partially transformed these cases, in part because most cases still 
proceed with an individual lead plaintiff, and in part because the cases may still be 
lawyer-driven—albeit with greater and more informed client input when led by 
institutional plaintiffs.286 But the PSLRA did not transform (and was not intended 
to transform) the underlying contingency-fee-based economic model for plaintiffs’ 
firms. Many of the dominant pre-PSLRA plaintiffs’ firms remained dominant post-
reform, and for straightforward reasons: they had the most expertise and 
experience to litigate such cases.287 They continued operating on the pre-PSLRA 
compensation model. In theory, plaintiffs’ law firms could collect billable-hour 
compensation at the end of the case, paid out from settlement funds, but that would 
fail to compensate the attorneys for the risk incurred in litigating a case with no 
assurance of payment. The “lodestar method,” by which courts check the 
plaintiffs’ firms’ requested legal fee by breaking it down into an hourly wage plus 
a multiplier for risk, is one way that courts, in effect, translate the plaintiffs’ 
lawyers’ fee into the more familiar billable hour in order to assess the fee’s 
appropriateness.288 Even under the status quo, these lawyers bill their time, and are 
overseen by institutional clients that can actually pay their bills directly. Still, the 
contingency fee reigns, as it should, when there are a large number of negative-
value claimants. 
Loss of the class action poses two potential threats to the class action 
plaintiffs’ bar: it might render plaintiff-side shareholder litigation economically 
unviable, and to the extent that it remains viable, it could attract new competitors. 
It is also possible, that loss of the class action could leave the field to meritorious, 
high-dollar arbitration with generous legal fees led by the same firms that currently 
dominate securities class action practice, while eliminating many of the firms that 
specialize in nuisance suits. I entertain each of these possibilities in the ensuing 
Sections. 
B. Loss of the Class Action Eliminates Shareholder Litigation and, by 
Extension, the Plaintiffs’ Bar 
There are several ways that the elimination of the class action would lead 
to the elimination of a separate plaintiffs’ bar. Some of these have already been 
noted. Overall damages claims could fall far enough to sharply reduce legal fees. 
Likewise, there could be a dearth of institutional investors with positive-value 
claims, particularly if plaintiff-pays provisions are not eliminated by the Delaware 
legislature, or halted by opposition from ISS.289 Without claims or clients, the 
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plaintiffs’ bar would disappear. Fund trustees and investment staffs might resist the 
amount of time, effort, and expertise that go into monitoring lawyers in litigation. 
This would be particularly true if the only successful business model would require 
a shift from a contingency to an hourly fee, with the institution writing monthly 
checks for substantial legal fees.  
Further, even if there were a sufficient number of positive-value 
claimants, loss of the class action would still pose significant challenges to the 
traditional plaintiffs’ bar. Rather than facing an early, decisive skirmish for control 
over the class action at the lead-plaintiff/lead-counsel selection stage, multiple 
firms might find themselves representing institutional clients in multiple 
arbitration proceedings over the same set of facts. For example, rather than be 
appointed lead counsel or co-lead counsel for the Enron securities class action, 
several firms would represent institutions in multiple arbitrations against Enron, its 
accountants, and its underwriters. This poses some risk that the available legal fees 
would be spread too thinly among a set of firms, rendering unviable the traditional 
model—particularly contingency-fee-based compensation. Economic theory might 
predict that a few firms would win this tournament—those with the strongest 
relationships with institutional investors and, hopefully, the best litigation track 
records. Because overall damages claims necessarily drop without the class action, 
much of the economic viability of shareholder arbitration would depend upon the 
ability of plaintiffs’ firms to recover a far higher percentage of claimed damages 
than they do currently. As noted, some of the results for institutional opt-outs 
suggest that sharply higher recoveries might be possible,290 although these opt-outs 
had the benefit of being able to rely on the work done in the class action. 
In sum, loss of the class action could translate into only a small number of 
shareholder litigations or arbitrations on behalf of institutional investors, with 
cases being too infrequent to support a law firm or practice devoted exclusively to 
the field. Decline of the relevant plaintiffs’ bar may be one goal of mandatory-
arbitration and fee-shifting provisions. Legal reforms have led to a decline in 
plaintiffs’ bars that were once active in other fields. Some academic and popular 
sources have suggested that the recent increase in patent litigation might be due to 
state-level tort reform, which they argue has substantially limited profits for 
plaintiffs’ law firms, possibly leading them to seek out alternative fields like patent 
litigation.291 One might ask where plaintiffs’ law firms might turn if they can no 
longer bring shareholder class actions. One potential candidate might be ERISA 
litigation, under which plaintiffs have statutory rights and the potential defendants 
are trustees, operating under trust law, and therefore may face legal barriers to 
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adopting mandatory-arbitration or fee-shifting procedures against their own 
beneficiaries.292  
C. Loss of the Class Action Leads to Replacement of Contingency Billing with 
the Billable Hour, and Potentially New Competitors 
It is also possible that sufficient positive-value claims will exist to justify 
the ongoing existence of shareholder litigation without class actions, but that 
immense payoffs in the form of high legal fees in class actions that settle for 
billions of dollars will disappear. And even if substantial legal fees could be 
cobbled together across a dozen or more arbitrations, the cost of litigating those 
could still be higher than litigating one class action; even if each individual 
arbitration is less costly than a class action. Should such large payoffs cease to 
exist, or should the cost of litigating numerous arbitrations exceed the costs of one 
class action for the lawyers, then the contingency-fee model might no longer be 
viable. The risk-reward calculation could be altered. Here, a billable-hour model 
might become more viable, or at least a blended model involving some billable 
hours and an outcome-dependent bonus. The potential rise of a billable-hour model 
and a client base that consists exclusively of institutional investors raises the 
possibility of new entrants into the field, assuming, again, that there are sufficient 
positive-value claims to support it. 
It is true that a billable-hour model would not eliminate the marketing 
challenges and conflicts of interest generated by suing the kinds of large corporate 
defendants that are, and would be, targeted in shareholder arbitration. But for 
reasons previously described, many large institutional investors that collect their 
pro rata share of settled class actions, but never participate as lead plaintiffs—like 
mutual funds, insurance companies, banks, hedge funds, and others—could be 
forced into more costly portfolio monitoring than they currently undertake, and 
even litigation, over positive-value claims. As fiduciaries, they face potential 
liability to their clients, customers, and shareholders if they fail to litigate potential 
fraud claims or cannot show that they were aware of the fraud and made a 
reasonable and conscious decision not to litigate it.293 Many of the same outside 
counsel that serve multinational corporate defendants in shareholder litigation also 
serve large institutional investor clients that could have positive-value claims. 
These law firms might then be forced to choose: help their clients monitor and 
litigate such claims, or send that business out of the firm; perhaps to a competitor 
or a satellite firm. One can imagine that traditional law firms might opt to keep this 
business. Representing large institutions in litigation or arbitration against other 
large institutions is what these firms do already, and it fits better with their 
marketing goals than class actions do. Such institutional clients may very well 
employ former associates of the law firms. Social-network effects, a converging 
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compensation model, and eased marketing challenges make it conceivable that 
traditional plaintiff-side shareholder litigation and arbitration could be absorbed 
into traditional defense firms as part of their securities and transactional practices. 
Another alternative is that this work could also be absorbed by ERISA 
and labor law firms that currently serve public-pension- and labor-union-fund 
clients, although this would require acquisition of completely new skill sets and 
practice areas by these firms. 
D. Loss of the Class Action—A New Normal for Leading Plaintiffs’ Law Firms 
Finally, it remains possible that the loss of the class action will eliminate 
plaintiffs’ firms that bring nuisance suits, while allowing top firms with 
institutional clients to continue practicing their trade in a new, but still somewhat 
familiar, litigation environment. Currently, nuisance firms bring cases with 
individual investor lead plaintiffs, mostly because they cannot find an institution 
that is interested enough in litigating the case. These firms survive by bringing 
cases no one else is interested in bringing, or by finagling their way onto lead 
counsel teams in substantial cases run by top firms, often by threatening to object 
to the settlement.294 Results for shareholders in cases brought by such firms are 
almost always disappointing.295 Some of the law firms that bring such cases have 
even been openly criticized on the record by judges. For example, in Revlon, Vice 
Chancellor Laster heavily criticized the original class counsel before finding that 
they failed to adequately represent the plaintiff–shareholder class and thus should 
be replaced.296 The class action enables nuisance firms to continue to bring suit 
without any screening by a sophisticated, motivated lead plaintiff. They must 
simply identify one individual investor who is willing to serve as a lead plaintiff, 
and file a class action on his or her behalf. Without the class action device, 
nuisance firms would have to secure representation of an institutional investor with 
a positive-value claim, something that might be difficult to do if the firms have an 
established track record of poor performance. 
Yet there is a small set of plaintiffs’ firms that regularly appear at the top 
of rankings like the Legal 500 and Securities Class Action Services.297 These firms 
earn significantly higher fees in shareholder and transactional litigation, 
presumably because they obtain better results for shareholders.298 These same 
firms provide portfolio-monitoring services to their institutional investor clients, 
whom they notify of exposure to claims, and on whose behalf they bring such 
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claims.299 These relationships could persist in arbitration. Instead of notifying their 
institutional clients when they have a large enough loss to obtain a lead-plaintiff 
appointment, they could notify them of positive-value claims, and aid them in 
deciding whether to proceed with such claims. Assuming that a significant number 
of such claims can be identified and prosecuted, it is possible that the firms could 
continue to exist without much change to their business models, including 
continued pursuit of a contingency-fee-based compensation model. Plaintiff-pays 
or loser-pays provisions make this less possible because plaintiffs’ lawyers might 
be unwilling to bear the risk of having to pay defense-counsel fees, unless perhaps 
the institutional clients are willing to engage in risk-sharing, or coalitions of 
plaintiffs firms agree to bear the risks together. 
Crucial to the ongoing success of such firms will not only be the question 
of whether there are a sufficient number of positive-value claims, but whether 
plaintiffs’ law firms will be able to substantially increase their recoveries as a 
percentage of damages claimed over what they obtain in class actions today. There 
are several reasons to believe that they might be able to do so, apart from the 
aforementioned success of institutional investors in opt-out actions.300 Many of the 
legal barriers erected against plaintiffs in the PSLRA and in a series of cases will 
not directly apply in arbitration. Corporate defendants may be more willing to 
settle on more favorable terms with large, well-connected institutional investors 
that have personal relationships with boards and senior managers, carry weight in 
the proxy proposal process and with shareholder voting, and could be sources of 
future capital. The confidential nature of arbitration proceedings might further pry 
open defendant purses, both because there will be less stigma to a high settlement 
that, if it were public, might be interpreted as being tantamount to an admission of 
liability, and because individual defendants can spend other people’s money, i.e., 
the corporate shareholder’s, to make the suit go away.301 That’s true now, but at 
least it’s public—it may not be in arbitration. It may also be that institutions 
writing substantial monthly checks to their lawyers in these cases may monitor 
those lawyers more closely and may themselves be more engaged in the litigation, 
producing better results. 
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V. FROM THE CIRCULARITY PROBLEM TO THE SEMI-CIRCULARITY 
PROBLEM, AND OTHER POLICY CONCERNS OF SHAREHOLDER 
LITIGATION WITHOUT CLASS ACTIONS  
A. The Semi-Circularity Problem 
Critics of the securities class action frequently point to the “circularity 
problem.”302 Large, diversified, institutional shareholders still own the defendant 
company they sue in these actions.303 Consequently, settling a securities class 
action is tantamount to shareholders transferring money from their left pocket to 
their right, minus attorneys’ fees.304 Such critics argue that shareholders would be 
better off had they never filed suit at all.305 Critics similarly argue that diversified 
investors are as likely to benefit from fraud as they are to be harmed by it.306 There 
have been several critical responses to the circularity problem. Professor James 
Park has argued that diversified investors benefit when there is less fraud in the 
market overall, and has further argued that securities class actions are no more 
circular than dividends, which also trigger transaction costs in the form of taxes, 
while still playing an important signaling role.307 Diversified shareholders may still 
benefit from bringing such actions to the extent they deter fraud in the market 
generally, even if they do not profit from them in specific cases. Professor Jill 
Fisch has argued that even if diversified investors do not benefit from the 
securities class action, concentrated investors do, and are the ones deserving 
protection.308 Concentrated investors make markets efficient.309 Rather than aiming 
to capture the overall market rate of return—minimizing firm-specific risk and 
research costs—concentrated investors “seek alpha,” that is, they aim to beat the 
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market.310 To do so, they incur substantial research costs and make concentrated 
bets.311 These investors trade on public information, impounding it into stock 
prices.312 These are the investors—and not necessarily the diversified investors—
that we want to protect from fraud. The ability to rely upon public statements made 
by companies in the reporting context and outside it is necessary for concentrated 
investors to continue to profit from their trading strategies.313 
Elimination of the securities class action replaces the circularity problem 
with a semi-circularity problem, assuming any litigation continues. Instead of an 
overlapping set of investors standing on both sides of the litigation as harmed 
plaintiffs and as ongoing owners of the defendant, the plaintiff profile shifts. Only 
investors with positive-value claims can sue and recover their damages.314 Thus, 
for the most part, this group will be composed of large institutional investors. 
Conversely, many smaller institutional investors—and most, if not all, individual 
investors—will have negative-value claims. Consequently, they will have no 
remedy for their wrong. Yet they may very well remain invested in the defendant 
company after the fraud. 
Thus, if there is a fraud or a mispriced deal, positive-value claimants can 
sue and recover, while negative-value claimants cannot. But the asymmetry runs 
deeper than just who can and cannot sue. As ongoing owners of the defendant, 
negative-value claimants still contribute their pro rata share of settlements obtained 
by positive-value claimants in arbitration. So, negative-value claimants are not 
only defrauded, but they must pay to compensate positive-value claimants for that 
fraud. This is the semi-circularity problem. 
In the most basic sense, this subsidy is unfair; it allows some investors to 
be reimbursed for their losses by payments from other investors who incurred the 
same losses. The subsidy also introduces a distortion in which the exact same trade 
for the same sum would be actionable if made through a large institution, but not 
through a small institution or an individual. A $5 million loss incurred by ten 
different individual investors would not create economically viable claims, 
whereas that same loss incurred by one institution would be economically viable. 
Unless we have some reason to believe that it is always better to invest through 
large institutions, loss of the class action needlessly introduces a distortion in the 
marketplace. It gives large institutions an unmerited legal advantage over smaller 
investors. 
The subsidy, and the loss of any remedy for smaller investors, also cuts 
against core, historical missions of securities regulation: the protection of 
individual investors, and what we might call “level playing field values.”315 
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Current and prior SEC chairpersons have made protecting individual investors a 
priority.316 The protection of individual investors was one of the original animating 
purposes of the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act.317 It has remained 
an important feature of securities regulation up until the present day. To illustrate 
this, consider three cornerstones of government enforcement of the securities laws: 
the disclosure rules, insider trading prosecutions, and Regulation Fair Disclosure 
(“Regulation FD”). 
Companies can issue securities to large, sophisticated institutional 
investors under a variety of exemptions318 that allow the companies to avoid the 
most burdensome and costly disclosure rules because these investors are 
sophisticated enough to “fend for themselves.”319 When selling to the investing 
public as a whole, companies must disclose more than when selling under an 
exemption.320 It follows that the investing public, which includes individual 
investors and smaller institutional investors, should have actual remedies for 
violations of the very rules of heightened disclosure that are designed to protect 
them in the first place. Here, loss of the class action deprives these investors of a 
remedy—particularly in the set of cases where we see only class actions, rather 
than SEC actions.321 In short, loss of the class action provides a litigation subsidy 
to funds that are the most capable of protecting themselves, while denying a 
remedy to those whom the rules are designed to protect. 
Insider trading takes place when either corporate insiders trade on 
material nonpublic information, or when corporate outsiders who have 
misappropriated information in breach of a fiduciary duty trade on that 
information.322 The direct economic harms of such trading may sometimes be 
trivial, but their direct economic harm is often not what motivates insider-trading 
enforcement. These cases are brought to maintain the public perception, and 
hopefully the reality, that investors trade on a level playing field, or something 
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approximating a level playing field.323 Ideally, markets should be able to rely on 
publicly disclosed information. This allows value investors, or concentrated 
investors, to weigh investment risks in making investment allocation decisions. 324 
The perception that it is impossible to trade successfully without access to insider 
information would undermine value investors from making trades, thereby 
reducing the availability of capital and liquidity.325 There is little point engaging in 
research and investment calculations when you cannot trust the numbers.326 High 
profile, insider-trading prosecutions are means of maintaining the perception that 
investors, particularly individual investors, are not trading in a rigged game.327 
Similarly, the SEC recently adopted Regulation FD for fair disclosure.328 
In the late 1990s, evidence emerged that corporate insiders were sharing material 
nonpublic information, like earnings reports, with favored analysts and 
institutional investors prior to disclosing such information via the formal reporting 
process.329 Such disclosures did not violate insider-trading rules because the 
information was not misappropriated, but was freely given, and the institutions 
breached no duty in trading on that information.330 But the SEC saw it as 
problematic, and rightly so. “Investors who see a security’s price change 
dramatically and only later are given access to the information responsible for that 
move rightly question whether they are on a level playing field with market 
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insiders.”331 The background section accompanying the announcement of 
Regulation FD drew the connection between Regulation FD and insider trading 
regulations: “Issuer selective disclosure bears a close resemblance in this regard to 
ordinary ‘tipping’ and insider trading.332 In both cases, a privileged few gain an 
informational edge—and the ability to use that edge to profit—from their superior 
access to corporate insiders, rather than from their skill, acumen, or diligence.”333 
The notion that investors make money through insider connections, rather than 
investment skill, implicates more than just basic fairness concerns. The widespread 
perception that one can only profit from trading with access to insiders would 
rationally deter anyone without connections from investing and trading. 
It seems unlikely that individual investors would immediately stop 
trading if they lost their right to participate in class actions, although it would 
create an additional incentive to shift their funds into institutional investors. 
Whether this would be a positive development is not clear. Despite the widespread 
perception that individual investors are “at best uninformed, at worst fools” there 
is some evidence in the finance literature that a subset of such investors is 
sophisticated and may outperform the market.334 Recent research has also 
suggested that individual investors serve the market by improving share price 
accuracy.335 It is true that there are already good reasons for individuals to stop 
trading and invest through institutions, such as lower trading costs and improved 
diversification tools.336 And while institutional investors have dramatically 
increased their market share in recent decades, a substantial minority of the market 
is still comprised of individual investors.337 They might just incur more 
unsubsidized losses, subsidize institutional losses, and invest in a market with less 
deterrence.  
Class action critics will point out, as I have already noted above, that 
class action recoveries are so small as to be of negligible value to investors, 
particularly individual investors. First, while that is true, that does not justify 
making these investors even worse off than they are now by barring the little 
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compensation they do receive and forcing them to subsidize the losses of large 
institutions. But more importantly, if the goal is to get individual investors to stop 
investing because it would be in their own interests to invest through institutions, 
then perhaps we should consider outright banning individual trading—or at least 
openly dissuading individuals from trading—rather than inducing them to shift to 
institutions by continuously degrading their rights, undermining their ability to 
assert them, and penalizing them for trading in the first place. 
B. The End of Pro Rata Compensation as a Goal of Shareholder Litigation 
Critics often mock the compensation rationale for securities class actions. 
Recoveries as a percentage of damages claims have often been pitifully small, in 
the single-digit percentage range.338 Judge Richard Posner argued almost 40 years 
ago that the purpose of such actions was not compensation but deterrence, and 
numerous other scholars have conceded that it is deterrence, and not 
compensation, that matters in these actions.339 Securities fraud suffers from the 
problem of asymmetric harms and rewards; a CEO who nets millions of dollars for 
herself by inflating a firm’s revenues can cause billions of dollars in harm when 
the truth is revealed.340 This asymmetry of harms and rewards makes adequate 
compensation difficult to obtain.341 Still, as I noted earlier, in the past two decades, 
courts and policymakers have not helped matters, by taking every opportunity to 
reduce compensation in such actions by: (1) placing a ceiling on damages;342 (2) 
eliminating aiding and abetting liability;343 (3) eliminating liability for fraud 
participants who were nonspeakers;344 (4) denying discovery prior to a ruling on 
the motion to dismiss;345 (5) instituting a higher pleading standard for scienter (the 
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highest pleading standard in civil procedure);346 (6) narrowing the scope of 
causation;347 (7) barring the litigation of securities cases by classes of 50 or more 
people in state court;348 and (8) allowing defendants to contest the efficiency of the 
market for purposes of fraud-on-the-market theory.349 Some academics have 
argued that compensation still plays an important role, that it reduces agency costs, 
and also serves a loss spreading function.350 
As discussed above, institutional investors might see their compensation 
improve in arbitration. Thus, loss of the class action does not so much put an end 
to the concept of compensation itself, as it puts an end to the idea that investors 
should be compensated proportionally to their losses. This departs from the 
traditional securities regulation goals of individual investor protection and “level 
playing field values” discussed above.351 
The loss of small compensation for individual investors might be 
outweighed by the benefits of institutional investor arbitration of shareholder 
claims. This would be particularly true if arbitration were to preserve or even 
enhance a deterrence function for private rights of action. Institutional investors 
with real losses may engage in appropriate case selection, bring meritorious cases, 
and vigorously litigate those cases. They might even improve the compensation 
they obtain in such actions over what they get now in class actions, although as 
noted, compensation for negative-value claimants will disappear altogether. It is 
also possible that institutional investors will demand, as a condition for settling an 
arbitration, that individually culpable defendants make personal payments towards 
the settlement. This has occurred on occasion, most notably in the WorldCom 
settlement.352 In most instances, the benefits of private rights of action will inure 
primarily to institutions, if the class action ceases to exist. Individuals might still 
benefit from whatever deterrence institutions are able to obtain from arbitrating 
their claims. But that will likely only be true for the very largest defendants. As I 
discuss in the next Section, loss of the class action may eliminate any deterrent or 
compensatory tools for smaller actions. These losses will tend to 
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disproportionately harm individual investors, who are less diversified and therefore 
less able to withstand them. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Collective prosecution of securities-fraud and transactional claims has 
faced repeated threats in the past two decades. These threats have offered frequent 
opportunities for academics and practitioners to debate the merits of such actions 
and how they measure up to their deterrent and compensatory goals. These 
debates, in turn, have filtered back into the legislative and judicial arenas. The 
most recent, and potent threat, to shareholder and transactional class actions has 
emerged from a combination of recent Supreme Court cases like Concepcion, 
American Express, and Animal Feeds, along with Delaware cases like 
Boilermakers and ATP. These cases have opened the door to unilateral board 
adoption of mandatory-arbitration provisions requiring bilateral arbitration of 
nonconsolidated, individual shareholder claims against the company. ATP has 
permitted plaintiff-pays provisions that might render contingency-fee 
arrangements too risky, though the Delaware legislature is currently considering 
legislation to overrule the case. Dozens of companies have already adopted such 
provisions, which may effectively eliminate the shareholder class action or other 
means of collectively pursuing shareholder claims, or at least cause a substantial 
restructuring of the plaintiffs’ bar. 
This Article contributes to two decades of debate about shareholder class 
actions by describing what shareholder claims would look like without the class 
action device. I demonstrate that loss of the class action would eliminate most, if 
not all, negative-value claims, thereby eliminating any remedy for substantial 
investor losses. Further, I show that certain types of remedies would cease to be 
pursued without class action litigation. Specifically even positive-value claimants 
would no longer pursue remedies such as corporate governance reform and 
disclosure-only or amendment settlements. The value of these remedies, 
particularly disclosure-only lawsuits, may be so marginal or even negative that 
their loss would not be missed. I point out that, without the class action, most 
transactional litigation would disappear, and would shift into appraisal arbitration, 
if it were to persist in any form. I argue that loss of the class action would 
eliminate a layer of legal insulation for fiduciaries of large institutional investors 
with positive-value claims. Such institutions might see increases to their 
monitoring and litigation costs, and perhaps their recoveries too, while potentially 
coercing them into bringing actions they might otherwise prefer not to bring. I 
offer some suggestive evidence tending to show that there will be at least a subset 
of institutions that will have large enough claims to maintain the viability of some 
form of shareholder litigation or arbitration without class actions. I also raise the 
possibility that overall damages might not drop as much as anticipated, even as 
overall damages claims do, because institutions with positive-value claims might 
be able to recover more in arbitration than they do today in class actions. The logic 
of fee-shifting provisions plays out somewhat differently, substantially increasing 
the costs to plaintiffs, placing great and perhaps unbearable strain on plaintiffs’ 
law firms, and deterring all but the most obviously meritorious lawsuits. I show 
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that the bizarre insurance landscape for public-pension funds, currently the most 
active lead plaintiffs in shareholder class actions, may make them more inclined 
than not to pursue marginally positive-value claims, particularly in the face of 
mandatory arbitration, and to engage in herding behavior around claims activity. I 
assess the range of possible effects that loss of the class action will likely have on 
the plaintiffs’ bar, from elimination of plaintiffs’ firms, to new competition from 
traditional law firms, to thriving practices for a small set of firms with established 
relationships to institutional clients. While loss of the class action could prompt 
enhanced public enforcement via the SEC and other regulatory bodies, resource 
constraints suggest that public actors may be limited in their ability to fill the 
void.353 
Finally, I assess how loss of the class action would clash with traditional 
policy goals of securities regulation, particularly its preoccupation with 
maintaining a level playing field for investors and protecting individual investors. I 
show that loss of the class action would create a “semi-circularity problem” where 
individual and other small investors not only are barred from recovering their 
losses, but are further burdened by having to subsidize the losses of institutional 
plaintiffs pursuing positive-value claims against companies still owned by 
individual and small institutional investors. This semi-circularity problem creates a 
distortion favoring large institutional investors at the expense of smaller 
institutions and individuals, although smaller investors might still benefit from any 
deterrence obtained by larger institutions bringing their own actions. I illustrate 
how loss of the class action is tantamount to abandonment of one traditional goal 
of shareholder litigation—compensation for injuries incurred—a goal that has been 
much maligned in recent years and may mostly matter insofar as it creates the 
aforementioned distortion. And I demonstrate that loss of the class action will 
eliminate any remedy for fraud or other corporate wrongdoing committed by 
smaller firms that today are targeted by class actions alone, and not the SEC. 
These points demonstrate that loss of the class action would mark a 
dramatic change to shareholder rights, to shareholder regulation more generally, 
and to the private attorney-general model that has served as a cornerstone of 
securities enforcement policy for decades. Some may welcome these 
developments, while others condemn them. There is enough uncertainty, enough 
flexibility in any fair-minded person’s assessment of the costs and benefits of such 
a momentous change, for reasonable people to disagree about its soundness. But 
there is substantial evidence that at least a subset of existing class actions are 
meritorious and value enhancing, that top firms and institutional lead plaintiffs, 
particularly public-pension funds, correlate with better outcomes for 
                                                                                                                
 353. See, e.g., Stephen Choi & Adam Pritchard, SEC Investigations and Securities 
Class Actions: An Empirical Comparison 11, 40 (U of Mich. Law & Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 12-022, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa
pers.cfm?abstract_id=2109739 (finding that median market capitalization for defendant 
firms in cases targeted by class actions alone ($765 million) is substantially smaller than 
median market capitalization in cases pursued by the SEC alone ($1.35 billion) or by both 
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shareholders.354 An optimal reform to shareholder litigation would offer flexibility 
and nuance, allowing preservation of meritorious, value-enhancing actions while 
eliminating frivolous ones. It is true that there is some reason to believe that 
arbitration could at least preserve some of these actions for large institutional 
investors, and that those actions might have some advantages over class actions, 
while also retaining some of the disadvantages noted above. Fee shifting may 
eliminate claims by all but the least risk-averse investor. Perhaps the Delaware 
legislature will attempt to place the fee-shifting genie back in its jar; opposition 
from ISS might also prevent the widespread adoption of these provisions. Overall, 
the prospect for nuanced legislative action seems dim, both because of institutional 
barriers to legislative reform and the current dysfunctional state of Congress. In the 
final analysis, the fate of the shareholder class action may be decided by the same 
corporate boards of directors who are the defendants in these suits, and who bear 
the state law fiduciary duties and the securities law obligations that these actions 
are designed to enforce.  
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